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A. Scope—Taxes in the Criminal Tax Enforcement System
THIS Article discusses the role of taxes in the federal criminal tax en-forcement system.  The centerpiece of the federal criminal tax en-
forcement system is the tax evaded.  Even when a criminal charge does not
have an element of tax evaded, the Government’s incentive to bring crimi-
nal tax charges is very low when there is no material amount of tax
evaded.1  The role of the amount of tax evaded results in some degree of
proportionality and implements the commonly stated concern that the
punishment fit the crime; as the reader might suspect, proportionality in
the tax crimes universe means that the more tax evaded, the more
punishment.2
In this Article, I address the various guises in which tax evaded ap-
pears in federal tax crimes sentencing.  Tax evaded must appear in the
guilt determination phase for the crime of tax evasion under 26 U.S.C.
§ 7201.  Tax evaded is an element of the crime.  The remaining tax crimes
* Partner, Townsend & Jones, L.L.P.  Significant parts of this outline have
been drawn—often verbatim—from the author’s current working draft of the next
edition of his self-published text titled Federal Tax Crimes.  The 2013 first edition of
this text is available on SSRN. See John A. Townsend, Federal Tax Crimes (Working
Paper, 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2212771 or http://dx.doi.org/
10.2139/ssrn.2212771.  All such materials are used without further attribution by
express permission of the author, being me.  I have benefitted greatly in this
presentation from Peter Hardy’s comprehensive publication: PETER D. HARDY,
CRIMINAL TAX, MONEY LAUNDERING AND BANK SECRECY ACT LITIGATION (2010).
1. See 26 U.S.C. § 7201 (2012).  An oft-theorized issue is whether the tax
evaded element of the crime of tax evasion, under section 7201, can be met with
an insubstantial or immaterial amount of tax evaded.  If the statute were read liter-
ally, a taxpayer evading $1.00 of tax could be convicted.  Perhaps reflecting the
concern that the law does not deal with trifles or, at least that juries will not convict
for trifles, some courts require that the tax evaded be substantial and some pattern
jury instructions to direct the jury. See, e.g., United States v. Helmsley, 941 F.2d 71,
83–84 (2d Cir. 1991) (“We have also required a showing that the deficiency was
substantial.”).  Some courts, however, read the statute literally and can find no
substantiality requirement for tax due and owing. See, e.g., United States v. Daniels,
387 F.3d 636, 639–41 (7th Cir. 2004) (involving, however, substantial tax evaded).
2. It is perhaps an overstatement to say no tax, no crime.  Or perhaps no tax,
no prosecution; or even no tax, no punishment.  And, to insert proportionality,
little tax, little punishment; or much tax, much punishment.  In a nutshell, that is
how the Sentencing Guidelines work. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005),
changes the rigidity in the Guidelines’ sentencing by the numbers approach, but
because the Guidelines are the starting point (and often the ending point) for
sentencing, understanding proportionality based on the tax evaded is important.
(599)
1
Townsend: Tax Evaded in the Federal Tax Crimes Sentencing Process and Beyon
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2014
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLR\59-3\VLR306.txt unknown Seq: 2 14-AUG-14 15:02
600 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59: p. 599
do not have tax evaded as an element;3 hence tax evaded may or may not
surface as a key issue in the guilt determination phase in prosecutions for
those crimes.  But, for all tax crimes, tax evaded is a critical and necessary
component of sentencing.
For purposes of this Article, I make two key assumptions at the outset.
First, I assume that the taxpayer is the actor in the tax evaded; the taxpayer
is the defendant in this Article.  Enablers such as return preparers and
promoters can also be charged with tax crimes where the tax evaded is tax
owed by others.4  I do not discuss enablers, but the concepts discussed in
this Article with respect to the taxes involved would apply equally in that
setting as well.
Second, I assume that the tax evaded was in the context of underre-
porting and underpayment with respect to the taxpayer’s return filing ob-
ligation.  This generally would be underreporting and underpayment with
respect to a filed tax return, although it could occur with respect to a
failure to file with an underpayment.  Tax evasion can occur with respect
to assessed taxes, but I do not deal here with that type of evasion—called
evasion of payment.  The most common form of evasion encountered by
most practitioners relates to evasion of assessment accomplished by under-
reporting and underpayment, the intended consequence of the
underreporting.
B. The Criminal Justice System
Our criminal justice system is multi-faceted.  At its most basic level, it
punishes conduct that violates norms imposed by society through criminal
laws.  But, the criminal justice system has significant goals other than pun-
ishment.  In the federal system, these various goals are summarized as “de-
terrence, incapacitation, just punishment, and rehabilitation.”5  The latter
three aspects deal with the individual before the court.  The first deals
3. The Internal Revenue Code has a number of tax crimes, but the principal
crimes encountered in practice are 26 U.S.C. §§ 7206(1) (often referred to as tax
perjury), 7206(2) (aiding and assisting), 7203 (failure to file), and 7212(a) (tax
obstruction).  These crimes do not have a textual requirement of evaded tax.
4. For example, in the prominent tax shelter prosecutions in the last ten
years, tax shelter enablers with major law and accounting firms were convicted for
evading the taxes of their clients. See, e.g., United States v. Coplan, 703 F.3d 46 (2d
Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 71 (2013); United States v. Pfaff, 407 F. App’x. 506
(2d Cir. 2010); United States v. Daugerdas, No. S3 09 CR 581, 2012 WL 92293
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 11, 2012).
5. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A (2013).  This highly sum-
marizes the factors set forth in the governing statute. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
(2012).  All references hereafter to the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual are
cited to the manual for 2013 (effective November 1, 2013), which was the most
current version at the time this Article was prepared.  Hence, for example, the key
tax Guideline will be cited as U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2T1.1.  Nota-
bly absent from the sentencing factors is the “quality of mercy.” See WILLIAM SHAKE-
SPEARE, THE MERCHANT OF VENICE act 4, sc. 1.
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with deterrence of others.  Deterrence is a critical part of the criminal tax
enforcement system.
C. The Criminal Tax Enforcement System
The criminal tax enforcement system must be understood in the con-
text of the role it plays in the tax system.  The tax system raises revenue for
the Government.  The Government could not function if it could not raise
revenue.6  Our tax system creates a number of incentives7 for taxpayers to
participate in the tax system and to pay their tax liabilities as, to para-
phrase Justice Holmes, the cost they pay for a civilized society.8  I deal here
principally with the criminal enforcement incentives.
The role of the criminal tax enforcement system is summarized as
follows:
The Government helps to preserve the integrity of this Nation’s
self-assessment tax system through vigorous and uniform crimi-
nal enforcement of the internal revenue laws.  Criminal prosecu-
tions punish tax law violators and deter other persons who would
violate those laws.  To achieve maximum deterrence, the Govern-
ment must pursue broad, balanced, and uniform criminal tax en-
forcement.  Uniformity in tax cases is necessary because tax
enforcement potentially affects more individuals than any other
area of criminal enforcement.  Broad and balanced enforcement
is essential to effectively deter persons of varying economic and
vocational status, violators in different geographic areas, and dif-
ferent types of tax law violations.9
6. Bull v. United States, 295 U.S. 247, 259 (1935) (“[T]axes are the lifeblood
of government, and their prompt and certain availability an imperious need.”).
7. Okay, these are commonly called penalties rather than incentives, but they
serve that function.
8. See Compania General de Tabacos de Filipinas v. Collector, 275 U.S. 87,
100 (1927) (Holmes, J., dissenting).  Taxes even have important religious aspects.
Jesus famously said that we should “give back to Caesar what is Caesar’s, and to
God what is God’s.” Matthew 22:21 (New International Version).  Perhaps inspired
by Jesus, in 2007, Pope Benedict was reported to be preparing a doctrinal pro-
nouncement in his second encyclical—the encyclical being the most authoritative
statement the Pope makes—asserting that evading taxes is “socially unjust.” Bene-
dict’s 2nd Encyclical Said to Condemn Tax Evasion by Wealthy as ‘Socially Unjust’, CATHO-
LIC ONLINE (Aug. 13, 2007), http://www.catholic.org/international/international_
story.php?id=25018.  Indeed, even before this, the Catholic Church ascribed tax
evasion as a violation of the Seventh Commandment. See CATECHISM OF THE CATH-
OLIC CHURCH, pt. 3, sec. 2, Exodus 20 2-17, available at http://www.vatican.va/
archive/ccc_css/archive/catechism/command.htm (“You shall not steal.”).  So,
there are religious, social, and moral imperatives to paying taxes.  Alas, however, I
deal in the text only with the legal aspects of paying taxes and obligations—such as
reporting taxes—related thereto.
9. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL § 6-4.010 (2007)
[hereinafter USAM], available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_read-
ing_room/usam/index.html.  This portion of the USAM is incorporated by refer-
ence in chapter 2.00 of the Department of Justice Tax Division (DOJ Tax)
3
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Similarly, and more succinctly, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) division
responsible for investigating tax crimes, Criminal Investigation (CI)—
often referred to as the Criminal Investigation Division (CID)10—explains
its role as follows: “Criminal Investigation serves the American public by
investigating potential criminal violations of the Internal Revenue Code
(IRC) and related financial crimes in a manner that fosters confidence in
the tax system and compliance with the law.”11
D. The Tax System in the Sentencing Process
The Introductory Comment to the key starting point for the Sentenc-
ing Guidelines calculations for tax crimes states:
The criminal tax laws are designed to protect the public interest
in preserving the integrity of the nation’s tax system.  Criminal
tax prosecutions serve to punish the violator and promote re-
spect for the tax laws.  Because of the limited number of criminal
tax prosecutions relative to the estimated incidence of such viola-
tions, deterring others from violating the tax laws is a primary
consideration underlying these guidelines.  Recognition that the
sentence for a criminal tax case will be commensurate with the
gravity of the offense should act as a deterrent to would-be
violators.12
The tax evaded—in sentencing jargon, the object of the criminal tax of-
fense—serves to ensure that “the sentence for a criminal tax case will be
commensurate with the gravity of the offense” and “act as a deterrent to
would-be violators.”13
E. Tax Liability Concepts in the Criminal Tax Universe
I stated earlier that tax evaded is the centerpiece of the sentencing in
criminal tax cases and, hence, is at the forefront from the earliest steps in
the criminal investigation and enforcement process, where practitioners
must anticipate and, if possible, shape what will happen at sentencing.  I
will first state generally the varying concepts of tax liability as they play out
in the criminal tax context and specifically at sentencing.  The key deter-
Criminal Tax Manual (CTM). See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL TAX MANUAL
§ 2.00 (2012) [hereinafter DOJ CTM], available at http://www.justice.gov/tax/
readingroom/2008ctm/CTMTOC.pdf.  Note that the 2008 reference in the URL
is misleading.
10. This criminal investigative branch of the IRS was formerly named Crimi-
nal Investigation Division, but the name was shortened to Criminal Investigation.
Nevertheless, it is still often referred to as CID.
11. IRS, Criminal Investigation’s Mission, IRM 9.1.1.2 (Nov. 4, 2004), available at
http://www.irs.gov/irm/part9/irm_09-001-001.html (detailing Criminal Investiga-
tion’s Mission).
12. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 2, pt. T, intro. cmt. (2013).
13. Id.
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minant in the advisory Sentencing Guideline calculations for financial
crimes is the financial loss to the victim.14  For taxes, the victim is the IRS;
the financial loss to the IRS is the tax loss which is, as will be discussed, the
principal determinant of Guidelines calculations for tax sentencing.
1. Civil Tax Liability and Tax Deficiency
A taxpayer may think of tax liability as what a taxpayer offers to the
IRS.  In the case of a filed return, the return is the taxpayer’s offer.  In the
case of an unfiled return, the taxpayer’s offer is nothing (except to the
extent of prepayments such as withholding or estimated taxes).  In either
case, the IRS may disagree and think the taxpayer owes more than the
taxpayer has offered.  That is the context for IRS investigations into liabil-
ity that may include both audits and criminal investigations.
The taxpayer will have a civil tax liability which is imposed on the
original due date of the return.15  That liability is determined before ap-
plication of payments.  To the extent that the liability exceeds the pay-
ments made or deemed made as of the due date of the return, the
taxpayer has an unpaid civil tax liability, often referred to in a civil context
as a deficiency.16  Taxpayers who fully pay their civil tax liability will usu-
ally not be at risk of criminal prosecution because of the phenomenon
noted above that punishment is determined by evasion of the unpaid
tax.17  At least usually, in the tax crimes universe, if there is no tax un-
derpaid, there is no crime—or at least no crime that the Government will
have the incentive to prosecute.18
14. See United States v. Babul, 476 F.3d 498, 502 (7th Cir. 2007) (discussing
Guidelines for fraud and theft offenses).
15. See 26 U.S.C. § 6151(a) (2012).
16. See id. § 6211(a) (providing definition of “deficiency”).  All references
hereinafter to sections are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 unless otherwise
noted.
17. This is a bit too broad of a statement.  Taxpayers who fully report their
liability but do not fully pay because, often, they are unable to do so, have no risk
of prosecution from the mere fact that they do not pay.  If they take action to avoid
paying the unpaid but reported taxes, then they may be criminally prosecuted ei-
ther for evasion of payment or one of the tax obstructive crimes—such as 26 U.S.C.
§ 7212(a) or its conspiracy counterpart, the Klein defraud conspiracy, 18 U.S.C.
§ 371.  Then, taxpayers will have nonpayment of the taxes as an object of their
criminal offense and the punishment can be made to fit the crime.  The Klein
conspiracy, named for the leading case, is the defraud conspiracy described in
section 371, appearing in a tax setting. See United States v. Klein, 247 F.2d 908 (2d
Cir. 1957); see also 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2012).  It is a term of art for the conspiracy to
impair or impede the lawful functions of the IRS.
18. At the risk of too much brevity to support this statement, given the rela-
tionship of the amount of tax evaded to the sentence, the Government is unlikely
to prosecute a taxpayer with no tax evaded even if his conduct meets the technical
definition of a crime that has no element of tax evaded.  For example, tax perjury
under section 7206(1) does not require tax to have been evaded.  The reason is
that the Guidelines—even with 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)/Booker discretion—generally
would require no incarceration, and, without incarceration, the message from the
conviction and sentence would be weak. See generally United States v. Booker, 543
5
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The actual unpaid tax liability—the deficiency as the Code defines
it—is not directly the key concept in tax crimes and sentencing.  The term
deficiency does not describe the tax, if any, a taxpayer intended to evade.
It is simply the unpaid tax.  The taxpayer may have intended to evade
some or all of the deficiency.19  Unfortunately, the term deficiency is used
by many cases to describe the portion of the deficiency that the taxpayer
intended to evade—what I call the tax evaded.20  In order to keep the
statutory term of art distinct, I use the term deficiency as used in the stat-
ute to mean the unpaid civil tax liability and will use a different term for
the portion of the deficiency the taxpayer intended to evade for the rea-
sons I now discuss.
2. The Tax the Taxpayer Intended to Evade—The Criminal Tax Numbers or
Figures
I think it helpful to illustrate the concepts in an example.  Assume
that, for civil tax purposes, the taxpayer had $100,000 of income that the
taxpayer failed to report and pay.  Assume that the tax liability on that
omitted income is $35,000; that liability is the deficiency.  The $100,000
omitted income consists of two items—$50,000 of embezzlement income
which the taxpayer knew was taxable and chose not to report and $50,000
of personal injury income that the taxpayer thought or could have reason-
ably thought was excludable under section 104 but which, for technical
reasons, is not properly excludable under that section.  In calculating the
tax evaded as an element of tax evasion, the Government will compute the
tax only on the $50,000 of embezzlement income and will not include the
$50,000 of personal injury income.  So, let’s say the tax on $50,000 of em-
bezzlement income is $17,500.  The criminal tax number for establishing
the evaded tax element in a tax evasion case is $17,500 (even though the
deficiency is $35,000).  The Government must prove the evaded tax be-
yond a reasonable doubt.
I need to explain now my use of the term evaded tax.  Section 7201
describes the crime of tax evasion as a willful attempt “to evade or defeat
any tax imposed by” title 26.21  It does not refer to the tax deficiency
U.S. 220 (2005).  The Government’s priorities thus focus the limited number of
tax prosecutions it can pursue on taxpayers who have not only tax evaded, but
substantial tax evaded.
19. See 26 U.S.C. § 6663.  This concept of dividing the tax deficiency between
the portions attributable to tax evasion and not attributable to tax evasion is recog-
nized in section 6663, the civil penalty counterpart to section 7201 evasion. See 26
U.S.C. § 7201.  Section 6663 imposes the civil fraud penalty only on the portion of
the tax attributable to fraud. See 26 U.S.C. § 6663(b).
20. See, e.g., Boulware v. United States, 552 U.S. 421, 432 n.9 (2008).  The
Court said that, although section 7206(1) requires no proof of a “tax deficiency,”
proof of features of a tax deficiency may be critical in the prosecution. Id.  In
October 2013, I did a LEXIS-NEXIS federal court search in the combined federal
court cases database on “7201 w/20 ‘tax deficiency’” and obtained 277 hits, includ-
ing several Supreme Court cases in addition to Boulware.
21. 26 U.S.C. § 7201.
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which, as noted above, has a defined meaning in the Code that is not the
same as evaded tax.  To be sure, courts—including the Supreme Court—
often refer to the evaded tax element as tax deficiency.22  Because of the
different Code meaning of the term tax deficiency, I think use of defi-
ciency for the evaded tax element is confusing.  The evaded tax element is
sometimes described as the tax “due and owing”—sometimes shortened to
just “tax due.”23  I find this formulation less descriptive of the evaded tax,
because just based on the words used it might be interpreted the same as
tax deficiency.  In this Article, I will use the term evaded tax because I
think it is more descriptive of the evasion element and because it permits
better development of the other concepts I discuss in this Article.24
Evaded tax is not the tax deficiency which is the civil tax number; it is
instead the part of the tax deficiency the taxpayer intended to evade.  In
the example, the deficiency would include the $50,000 personal injury in-
come, which, let’s say, doubles the tax deficiency to $35,000.  The defi-
ciency is never less than the criminal tax number (referred to here as the
evaded tax) and is often more because of the phenomenon I just men-
tioned—i.e., some components entering the deficiency may not be items
resulting in evaded tax.
Finally, as I develop in the example, the evaded tax is the portion that
would be the element of the crime of tax evasion, which is the issue de-
cided in the guilt determination phase before sentencing.  This Article
does not discuss the guilt determination phase, but I think the foregoing
22. See Boulware, 552 U.S. at 432 n.9.  For a discussion of courts’ references to
the evaded tax element as tax deficiency, see supra note 20 and accompanying text.
23. See, e.g., United States v. Scheuneman, 712 F.3d 372, 375 (7th Cir. 2013)
(“[T]ax due and owing . . . .”); DOJ CTM, supra note 9, Government Proposed Jury
Instruction No. 26.7201-3, available at http://www.justice.gov/tax/readingroom/
2008ctm/CTM%20JI%20-%20Title%2026.pdf (“[T]axes due and owing . . . .”);
DOJ CTM, supra note 9, Government Proposed Jury Instruction No. 26.7201-1, available
at http://www.justice.gov/tax/readingroom/2008ctm/CTM%20JI%20-%20Title
%2026.pdf (“[T]ax due . . . .”).  For additional discussion of this issue, see Jack
Townsend, For Tax Evasion, Is the Element “Tax Deficiency” or “Tax Due and Owing,”
FED. TAX CRIMES BLOG (Oct. 14, 2013, 9:46 AM), http://federaltaxcrimes.blogspot.
com/2013/10/for-tax-evasion-is-element-tax.html.  I also will have an expanded
discussion of this issue in the next published version of my FEDERAL TAX CRIMES
text, which will be available, when published on my SSRN site later in 2014.
24. My dislike of the use of the term deficiency to mean the tax the taxpayer
intended to evade could be semantics if the term deficiency is considered in the
context of a criminal prosecution.  Because each element of a crime must be
proved beyond a reasonable doubt, necessarily the tax evasion component of the
prosecution must exclude the portion of the deficiency that the taxpayer did not
intend to evade.  Stated otherwise, when the element is stated as just the defi-
ciency, it necessarily, because of the burden of proof, means only the portion of
the civil tax deficiency that the taxpayer intended to evade.  I just prefer to avoid
this type of semantic uncertainty and use terms that are more descriptive of their
functions in the similar but not exactly parallel civil and criminal universes.  I will
admit that my term “tax evaded” does conflate the willfulness element with the tax
that the taxpayer intended to evade.  I do not think that possible conflation is
critical to this Article, because the crime of tax evasion is not the focus.
7
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example illustrates the concept of tax evaded for that purpose.  The tax
evaded concept does carry forward into the sentencing phase via two key
concepts—the sentencing tax loss, which is the principal driver of the sen-
tence, and restitution.
3. Sentencing Tax Loss
The Sentencing Guidelines use “tax loss” as the principal component
in the advisory guideline sentencing range for a defendant convicted of
one or more tax or tax related crimes.  The Sentencing Guidelines define
tax loss as “the total amount of loss that was the object of the of-
fense . . . .”25  It is the same as the tax the taxpayer intended to evade—
“tax evaded” as I use the term.26  There are some key nuances in the tax
loss concept in the Guidelines that may cause the tax loss to exceed the tax
evaded number used in the guilt determination phase.  First, because sen-
tencing findings (including tax loss) are determined by a preponderance
of the evidence rather than beyond a reasonable doubt, the evaded tax for
Sentencing Guidelines purposes may include more components than tax
evaded for guilt of the crime of tax evasion.27  Second, the tax loss can
include tax loss for “relevant conduct”—other related crimes for which
25. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2T1.1(c)(1) (2013); see also id.
§ 2T1.1 cmt. n.1 (“Although the definition of tax loss corresponds to what is com-
monly called the ‘criminal figures,’ its amount is to be determined by the same
rules applicable in determining any other sentencing factor.”).  Translated into
terms used here, that means that the Government must prove tax evaded by a
preponderance of the evidence rather than beyond a reasonable doubt.  I should
note one nuance that I do not deal with in the text.  The tax loss is the loss that
occurred or would have occurred had the object been achieved.  In the situation
discussed in the text, an evasion resulting from the filing of a return underreport-
ing the tax liability, the taxpayer achieves the benefit of the evasion by not report-
ing and paying the tax.  What if, however, the conduct giving rise to the evasion
was intended to report and pay less tax in future years—for example, the fraudu-
lent claiming of purchase of a depreciable asset that could be depreciated or amor-
tized over, say, twenty years, and the taxpayer is prosecuted in year 2003 for evasion
from claiming the false depreciation in years 2001 and 2002?  As it is articulated,
such an unrealized but intended tax evasion might be included in the tax loss.
Consider a taxpayer who files 1,000 fraudulent claims for refund, which, if granted,
would have generated refunds of $100 million.  The IRS never grants the refunds.
The tax loss is $100 million. See, e.g., United States v. Eye, 520 F. App’x 852 (11th
Cir. 2013).  Compare that to a taxpayer who commits the evasion by underreport-
ing and never paying the tax at all.  That taxpayer’s tax loss is $100 million.  In
terms of culpability, are these two evasions the same as the calculation of the tax
loss seems to suggest?  Consider a similar example using the depreciation scenario
above, where the taxpayer receives the full tax loss in the first two years.  Are they
the same in terms of culpability?
26. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2T1.1 cmt. n.1 (2013).  Applica-
tion Note 1 says: “Although the definition of tax loss corresponds to what is com-
monly called the ‘criminal figures,’ its amount is to be determined by the same
rules applicable in determining any other sentencing factor.” Id.  The criminal
figure is the same as tax evaded as I use this term.
27. I illustrate this in an example in the next paragraph of the text.
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the defendant was not convicted.28  The relevant conduct concept is de-
scribed as the cornerstone of the Guidelines (although consistent with
pre-Guidelines sentencing practice) and plays a major role in tax cases
where multiple years or events may be involved.29
Consider this example: The indictment alleges that the taxpayer
evaded $100,000.  That means that the prosecutors believe they can prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that the taxpayer evaded $100,000.  The tax-
payer is convicted on that basis.  Suppose, however, that, for sentencing
purposes, the Government can prove by a preponderance of the evidence
that the taxpayer really evaded $200,000, but did not allege the additional
$100,000 in the indictment because it did not believe that it could prove
that additional amount beyond a reasonable doubt.  Further, suppose that
the taxpayer’s real unpaid civil tax liability for the year is $300,000, with
the additional $100,000 representing items for which the Government
cannot prove the taxpayer intended to evade under any standard of proof.
There are three concepts related to the overall unpaid civil tax liability.  In
the order presented, they are: (i) the evaded tax—the “criminal num-
ber”—of $100,000 used for purposes of charging and convicting for eva-
sion; (ii) the evaded tax for sentencing purposes—the tax loss—of
$200,000, consisting of the evaded tax of $100,000, proved beyond a rea-
sonable doubt, and the evaded tax of $100,000 proved by a preponder-
ance of the evidence; and (iii) the residual tax of $100,000 not related to
tax evasion for any criminal purpose (i.e., it solely affects civil tax liabil-
ity).30  The three components in the aggregate represent the civil tax lia-
28. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.3 (2013).  The Guidelines de-
fine relevant conduct as all acts or omissions (broadly defined to include conspira-
cies, aiding and abetting, etc.) “that were part of the same course of conduct or
common scheme or plan as the offense of conviction . . . .” Id. § 1B1.3(a)(2).
Application Note 2 of section 2T1.1 states: “In determining the total tax loss attrib-
utable to the offense, all conduct violating the tax laws should be considered as
part of the same course of conduct or common scheme or plan unless the evi-
dence demonstrates that the conduct is clearly unrelated.” Id. § 2T1.1 cmt. n.2
(internal citation omitted).
29. See, e.g., William W. Wilkins, Jr. & John R. Steer, Relevant Conduct: The Cor-
nerstone of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 41 S.C. L. REV. 495, 499 (1990).  This
article was written by authors intimately involved in conceptualizing and drafting
the original Guidelines, which incorporated as a centerpiece the concept of rele-
vant conduct. See id. at 495 nn.a–aa (discussing authors’ credentials).  I should
note that prior to the introduction of the specific terminology in the Guidelines,
the courts could consider what is now called relevant conduct in determining
sentences. See DOJ CTM, supra note 9, § 43.04.  Hence, the general concept was
not new, but the Guidelines’ adoption of the concept under the rubric of “relevant
conduct” regularized its consideration in the sentencing process by addressing
scope issues for relevant conduct and requiring that relevant conduct be consid-
ered in sentencing.
30. Conceivably, some portion or all of the third amount might be subject to
the civil fraud penalty under the burden shifting rules in section 6663 if the trier of
fact is in a state of equipoise as to whether this final unpaid portion is or is not
attributable to fraud. See 26 U.S.C. § 6663 (2012).  Resolutions of such cases by
9
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bility (or deficiency), whereas only the first two are evaded taxes relevant
to the criminal process.
This is a simplified example.  As I will note later, there are other con-
cepts that can cause the sentencing tax loss to vary from the tax evaded
used in the guilt determination phase.  The principal concept is the rele-
vant conduct Guidelines concept that requires, or at least permits, the sen-
tencing court to include in the base offense calculations criminal conduct
for unconvicted crimes.  In a criminal tax setting involving income taxes,
the relevant conduct is the tax loss from similar evasive conduct in years
other than the year(s) in the count(s) of conviction.  I used a single year
in the example above, but assume that the taxpayer had similar evasive
conduct in three other years and tax loss in the same amount—
$200,000—for each of the years (the one convicted year and the three
unconvicted years).  The tax loss for those unconvicted years can be in-
cluded in the tax loss computation regardless of whether (i) the defendant
was acquitted of criminal conduct for the unconvicted years;31 (ii) crimi-
nal conduct was charged for the unconvicted years but dismissed pursuant
to the plea agreement; or (iii) criminal conduct was never charged for the
unconvicted years for whatever reason, including expiration of the statute
of limitations.32  Hence, if the three other years involved the same type of
conduct, the defendant’s tax loss number would be $800,000 rather than
$200,000.  That makes for a significantly higher sentencing range under
the Guidelines.33  Relevant conduct tax losses to drive up sentencing are
frequently encountered in tax cases.
burden of proof equipoise are rare, so in most of the cases of the type described,
the final $100,000 will not be treated as tax evaded for criminal or civil purposes.
31. See United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 154 (1997) (holding there to be
no violation of Double Jeopardy Clause).  The Court in Watts based its holding on
the notion that such sentencing enhancements “do not punish a defendant for
crimes of which he was not convicted, but rather increase his sentence because of
the manner in which he committed the crime of conviction” and the lower stan-
dard of proof. Id. at 154–56.  Note that in this regard, there is a similar civil tax
analog which permits the Government to assert civil fraud even if the defendant
has been acquitted of criminal evasion for the same period(s), a result justified by
the lower standard of proof (generally as to fraud in a civil case, requiring clear
and convincing evidence). See Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 397–98 (1938).
32. See DOJ CTM, supra note 9, § 43.04 (citing cases involving conduct be-
yond statute of limitations and other uncharged conduct).
33. The range thus calculated is limited by the maximum terms in the aggre-
gate for the count(s) of conviction.  For example, if the range calculated for the
aggregate tax loss with all relevant conduct included were—when combined with
other sentencing factors—to indicate a sentence exceeding the maximum terms
for the counts of conviction, the sentence would be limited to the maximum for
the count(s) of conviction.  That maximum could then be subject to section
3553(a)/Booker downward variances, but not upward variances. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a) (2012); United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 222 (2005).
10
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4. Restitution
a. The Concept—Reimbursing the Victim for Financial Loss
Restitution is reimbursement to the victim for the financial loss re-
lated to the crime(s) the defendant committed.34  For federal tax crimes,
the victim is the public via the IRS.35  Accordingly, restitution, when or-
dered in criminal tax cases, is made to the IRS.  Unlike tax loss, which is
the amount that was the object of the crime, restitution is reduced by pay-
ments up to the point that restitution is quantified in the restitution order,
so that it is the remaining unpaid tax evaded at the time restitution is
imposed.36  In this regard, where it is possible for the defendant to pay all
of the evaded tax prior to sentencing, it is to the defendant’s benefit to do
so because, in addition to reducing or eliminating restitution, it sets the
right tone for the judge to give the defendant discretionary benefits in the
sentencing process.
b. Statutory Mandatory and Permissive Restitution
Restitution may be imposed by the court pursuant to two overlapping
provisions: 18 U.S.C. § 3663, the general restitution provision, and 18
U.S.C. § 3663A, the Mandatory Victim Restitution Act (MVRA).37  These
statutes require or permit restitution for tax related title 18 crimes (includ-
34. See United States v. Innarelli, 524 F.3d 286, 293–94 (1st Cir. 2008) (“This
is necessarily a backward-looking inquiry that takes into account what actually hap-
pened, including whether the victim managed to recover some or all of the value it
originally lost.”).  In sentencing, the court is required to consider “the need to
provide restitution to any victims of the offense.”  18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(7).  “If the
court does not order restitution, or orders only partial restitution, the court shall
include in the statement the reason therefor.” Id. § 3553(c) (flush language).  Fi-
nally, restitution is decided by the judge alone, because it is not punishment sub-
ject to the requirement that the jury determine the amount of restitution. See
United States v. Milkiewicz, 470 F.3d 390, 403–04 (1st Cir. 2006); United States v.
Leahy, 438 F.3d 328 (3d Cir. 2006); United States v. May, 413 F.3d 841, 849 (8th
Cir. 2005).
35. See DOJ CTM, supra note 9, § 44.02[1] (citing cases).
36. There is a nuance.  Even where the defendant has paid the victim of the
crime (here the IRS), the court may order restitution and note that it has already
been paid, meaning that, to the extent paid, there is no restitution remaining due
as of the sentencing.  I intend the concept here to mean the unpaid portion of the
restitution ordered at sentencing.
37. See 18 U.S.C. § 3556 (referencing sections 3663A and 3663); see also
United States v. Amato, 540 F.3d 153, 159 (2d Cir. 2008).  Restitution, although
intended to compensate the victim, does not make the victim a party to the sen-
tencing proceeding in which restitution is imposed.  The sentencing court may
hear from the victim and will certainly consider the victim’s claims.  But, a victim
not satisfied with the restitution order has no standing to appeal. See United States
v. Stoerr, 695 F.3d 271, 276 (3d Cir. 2012).
11
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ing the ubiquitous Klein defraud conspiracy).38  Restitution, where author-
ized, takes priority over fines.39
Mandatory restitution is only permitted for losses from the count(s)
of conviction and not for any conduct that may be considered as relevant
conduct—criminal conduct outside the count(s) of conviction—in deter-
mining the tax loss which is the principal driver for the Guidelines sen-
tencing range.40  For example, assume that the defendant pleads as is
typical in a tax case.  The plea agreement provides: (i) the single count of
conviction under the plea is a Klein conspiracy, a title 18 offense, for the
years 2002–2006; (ii) the tax loss is $100,000 in each year, for a total of
$500,000; and (iii) restitution is not addressed.  In this example, the sen-
tencing tax loss and the amount for restitution is the same, provided that
the defendant has not paid any of the tax loss.  The sentencing court can
order restitution to the IRS for the tax loss in the years 2002–2006, aggre-
gating $500,000.41  But, if in addition to the charged conspiracy, there was
a different but similar uncharged Klein conspiracy covering the years 2000
and 2001, with $100,000 tax loss in each of those years, the tax loss arising
from that conspiracy could be included in the tax loss as relevant conduct
for sentencing (thus increasing the tax loss to $700,000) but could not be
38. See DOJ CTM, supra note 9, § 44.02[2] (“Although the MVRA does not
apply to criminal violations of Title 26, the MVRA does apply to criminal tax cases
involving violations of Title 18, when the offenses are committed by fraud or deceit
and are offenses against property, such as conspiracy to defraud the United States
or to commit tax fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371, or mail fraud, in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 1341.”).  The Klein conspiracy is a term of art in criminal tax matters,
referring to the defraud conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 371.  The defraud conspir-
acy textually is a conspiracy “to defraud the United States, or any agency thereof in
any manner or for any purpose . . . .”  18 U.S.C. § 371.  The defraud conspiracy in
a tax setting is usually stated as a conspiracy to impair or impede the lawful func-
tions of the IRS and, as articulated in United States v. Klein, 247 F.2d 908 (2d Cir.
1957), hence, in a tax setting, the defraud conspiracy is often referred to as a Klein
conspiracy.
39. See 18 U.S.C. § 3572(b); see also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL
§ 5E1.1(c) (2013).
40. See Hughey v. United States, 495 U.S. 411, 413 (1990).  Despite the post-
Hughey enactment of the MVRA and subsequent amendments of the Victim and
Witness Protection Act (VWPA), the holding of Hughey remains good law. See
United States v. Scheuneman, 712 F.3d 372, 380–81 (7th Cir. 2013) (allowing resti-
tution for multiple years within scope of section 7212(a) tax obstruction conviction
because pattern of conduct subject to charge and conviction covered multiple
years, so related to count of conviction and not relevant conduct); United States v.
Batson, 608 F.3d 630, 637 (9th Cir. 2010); United States v. Nolen, 523 F.3d 331,
332 n.2 (5th Cir. 2008); United States v. Maturin, 488 F.3d 657, 660–61 (5th Cir.
2005); United States v. Inman, 411 F.3d 591, 595 (5th Cir. 2005) (citing United
States v. Mancillas, 172 F.3d 341, 343 (5th Cir. 1999)) (noting that MVRA only
permits “restitution for the conduct underlying the offense for which he was
convicted”).
41. See Scheuneman, 712 F.3d at 380 (holding that restitution order could en-
compass losses “directly attributable” to section 7212 conviction, which unlike
many tax crimes, but like conspiracy, can be course of conduct over many years,
thus expanding scope of potential restitution); Maturin, 488 F.3d at 660–61.
12
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included in restitution, because it is not within the scope of the offense of
conviction.  There are other possible differences between the tax loss and
the amount of restitution, but you will note that both key off the evaded
tax, with differences then created for other reasons.
Even if otherwise not covered by these statutory restitution provisions
(title 26 crimes are not covered), the court is authorized by statute to im-
pose restitution as a condition of some benefit to the defendant, such as
probation or supervised release as opposed to incarceration.42
c. Contractual Restitution
The sentencing court may order restitution to the extent provided in
a plea agreement.43  The Department of Justice Tax Division’s (DOJ Tax)
policy is generally to require contractual restitution in the plea agreement
for the tax loss for both the pled counts and for counts that are dismissed
pursuant to the plea.44  Presumably, DOJ Tax might also require contrac-
tual restitution for relevant conduct, which includes uncharged tax
crimes.45
II. TAX LOSS
A. A Simple Example to Illustrate the Key Role of Tax Loss
1. Introduction
Consider this example, following the format for the Guidelines to il-
lustrate how the Guidelines work in a tax setting: The taxpayer is convicted
on one count of tax evasion for one year, the 2001 tax year, with the re-
turn being filed on April 15, 2002.46  In that return, the taxpayer fraudu-
lently omitted an item of income of $250,000 from a legal source,
resulting in a tax underpayment—tax evaded—of $85,000.  I assume that
$85,000 is the “criminal number” and, for present purposes, also the “tax
42. See 18 U.S.C. § 3563(b)(2) (discussing restitution as condition of proba-
tion); id. § 3583(d) (referencing section 3563(b)(1)–(10)); see also United States v.
Perry, 714 F.3d 570, 577 (8th Cir. 2013); United States v. Hassebrock, 663 F.3d 906,
923–24 (7th Cir. 2011); Batson, 608 F.3d at 635.
43. See 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)(3).
44. See USAM, supra note 9, § 6-4.370; JOINT IRS/DOJ TASK FORCE ON RESTITU-
TION, MEMORANDUM RE STANDARD LANGUAGE FOR PLEAS AND ORDERS IN CRIMINAL
TAX CASES INVOLVING RESTITUTION (2010) [hereinafter IRS/DOJ MEMO RE STAN-
DARD LANGUAGE], available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_
room/usam/title6/tax00018.htm.
45. This would depend upon the parties’ respective bargaining positions and
often really turns upon limitations in resources allocable to determine tax loss at-
tributable for other years.  For example, IRS CI often does not investigate earlier
years that could include relevant conduct simply because of a lack of resources
and, perhaps, a feeling that the crime is adequately punished by the tax loss in the
years investigated.
46. I choose this year in order to use the 2001 Sentencing Guidelines, which
generally establish a higher Base Offense Level (BOL) for tax loss numbers than
under the prior Guidelines.
13
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loss,” which means that it is the tax on the components of income or de-
duction that results from evasion.  The evasion was simple, garden-variety
evasion, with no evasive or “sophisticated” measures to hide the omitted
income or implement the evasion, such as using fictitious names, offshore
accounts, and the like.  The first step in the application of the Sentencing
Guidelines is to determine the offense conduct and the Base Offense
Level (BOL) that is determined by the offense conduct.47
2. Applicable Offense Guideline
Chapter 2 of the Guidelines is the starting point.  Chapter 2 deter-
mines the offense conduct and lists the various federal offenses and statu-
tory provisions.  Tax crimes are addressed in part T of chapter 2.  Tax
crimes for this purpose may be divided analytically into two parts: (1) the
crime itself and (2) the amount of tax that was the object of the crime (the
tax loss).
The starting point is the BOL.  Section 2T1.1 of the Sentencing
Guidelines provides a BOL of six, unless the BOL under the graduate tax
loss table in section 2T4.1 is higher.48  I encourage readers to review the
tax loss table in section 2T4.1 of the 2013 Sentencing Guidelines.  In our
example ($85,000 of tax loss), the tax loss table provides a BOL of
sixteen.49
We then go to the Specific Offense Characteristics in section 2T1.1(b)
of the Sentencing Guidelines, which provides two level increases for illegal
income for the tax loss and for “sophisticated means.”50  The example we
consider provides that the income is legal income and that no sophisti-
cated means were involved.51  Coming out of chapter 2 then, the offense
level is sixteen (which is the BOL derived above).  After this, the BOL is
commonly called the offense level, which is subject to some adjustments.
3. Adjustments
Guidelines chapter 3 allows adjustments to the offense level.  There
are victim-related adjustments (upward, but not applicable in tax cases),
role in the offense (leader, minimal participant) adjustments (upward or
downward), obstruction of justice adjustments (upward), multiple counts
47. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.1(a)(1)–(2) (2013).
48. Id. § 2T1.1(a).
49. Id. § 2T4.1 (providing tax table).
50. Id. § 2T1.1(b)(2).
51. A straight-forward reading of the presentation in the Guidelines would
suggest that the upward adjustment for sophisticated means is reserved for excep-
tional tax crimes cases.  There has been some concern among practitioners that
sophisticated means has become the rule and not the exception in tax cases. See
Letter from Richard M. Lipton, Chair, ABA Section of Taxation, to Donald A.
Purdy, Jr., Chief Deputy, Gen. Counsel, U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, Comments Con-
cerning Proposed Amendments to the United States Sentencing Guidelines (Mar.
30, 2001), reprinted in 2001 TAX NOTES TODAY 68-67 (2001).
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adjustments (upward in some cases), and acceptance of responsibility ad-
justments (downward).  These are the types of matters judges considered
before the Guidelines in determining appropriate sentences, but now they
are formalized as steps in the Guidelines calculations.
The adjustment relevant in our example is a reduction for “accept-
ance of responsibility,”52 which is most commonly achieved by entering a
plea agreement.  The reduction is at least two levels.53  An additional one-
level reduction is allowed if the level prior to the two-level reduction is
sixteen or greater and the Government states that the defendant timely
assisted by notifying the Government of intention to plead prior to prepa-
ration for trial.54
You are comfortable that your client has accepted responsibility and
will qualify for this benefit if your client agrees to plead guilty.  But, your
client still wants to know what the sentencing range is before pleading.  A
plea qualifying for this adjustment would reduce the offense level by
three.55  Now your client is at offense level thirteen.
4. Criminal History or Livelihood
Chapter 4 then provides for upward adjustments on the sentencing
table for significant criminal history.  In this case, as is common in tax
prosecutions, the defendant has none, so we will move on, carrying for-
ward the offense level of thirteen.
5. Application of the Sentencing Table
The final Guidelines step is to apply the adjusted offense level, which
is now thirteen, to the sentencing table contained in chapter 5, part A.
The sentencing range is twelve to eighteen months.56
52. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1 (2013).
53. Id. § 3E1.1(a).
54. Id. § 3E1.1(b).
55. The better part of wisdom is to commit the prosecutors to the full three-
level downward adjustment in the plea agreement.  The sentencing judge does not
have to accept that commitment, but it usually is persuasive to the judge.
56. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 5, pt. A (2013).  These
ranges do not take into account the good time credit that may be available to the
actual sentence to require incarceration less than imposed by the judge.  Section
3624(b) provides that, if the term is more than one year, the defendant may re-
ceive “up to 54 days at the end of each year of the prisoner’s term of imprison-
ment, beginning at the end of the first year of the term . . . .”  18 U.S.C.
§ 3624(b)(1) (2012).  As interpreted, a prisoner will get about 12.88% per year for
good time credit, meaning that the allowable number of days’ credit per year is
forty-seven.  For example, a sentence of one year requires time served of 365 days,
while a sentence of one year and one day requires time served of 319 days.  Practi-
tioners and judges know this phenomenon; rarely is a sentence for one year given.
15
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6. The Final Sentence—18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)/Booker Discretion
The foregoing completes the Guidelines calculations of a sentencing
range.  The Supreme Court’s opinion in United States v. Booker57 mandates
that the Guidelines are advisory and are to be considered along with the
other section 3553(a) factors in determining the final sentence.58  The tax
evaded will already be known to the judge because it is the key component
of the Guidelines advisory calculations.  So, the judge will undoubtedly
consider the tax evaded in fashioning the final sentence under his Booker
discretion.
7. Summary—Key Role of the Tax Loss Number
Returning to the Guidelines calculations, notice how key the starting
point—the BOL—is to the process.  In tax cases, the BOL is determined
by the tax loss.  In this example, the tax loss is $85,000, which drives the
BOL (prior to adjustments) to sixteen, and the sole adjustment is for ac-
ceptance of responsibility, driving the offense level to thirteen.
If you can drive the tax loss down $5,000 to $80,000, the process pro-
duces a sentencing range of ten to sixteen months.59  Note correspond-
ingly, however, that if the tax loss were $200,000, you would still be in the
same Guideline range and you would have a long way to reduce the tax
loss to the next break point of $80,000.  But to turn that thought, the
Government would only have a short way to go to ratchet your client into
the next higher level, producing a sentencing range of eighteen to twenty-
four months.
B. More on the Tax Loss
1. General
In the usual criminal prosecution, the initial investigation is con-
ducted by IRS CI.  The “criminal tax figure” and, if different, the tax loss60
is initially calculated by the IRS based on its investigation and included in
the Special Agent’s Report (SAR) that is sent to DOJ Tax with the recom-
mendation for prosecution or further grand jury investigation.61  Where
the investigation is a grand jury investigation, CI special agents will be as-
signed to assist the grand jury under Rule 6(e) and will prepare an SAR
57. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
58. See id. at 245; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
59. The Base Offense Level is fourteen, but the adjustment for acceptance of
responsibility is two, rather than three.
60. Remember that these figures could be different if relevant conduct brings
in non-conviction years or tax evaded provable only by a preponderance of the
evidence is included.
61. See IRS, Special Agent Report (SAR), IRM 9.5.8.6 (Jan. 25, 2006), available at
http://www.irs.gov/irm/part9/irm_09-005-008.html#d0e291.  Note that one of
the required inclusions is “relevant conduct.” See id.  There will also be sentencing
calculations.
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when the grand jury investigation is complete.62  In both instances, the CI
special agent may be assisted by a civil agent.63  At least when the IRS CI is
involved, the defendant’s64 attorney may have some opportunity to have
meaningful input in the criminal and tax loss calculations, both involving
tax evaded numbers.
Also keep in mind that the practitioner will have opportunities to con-
tinue the process of reducing the tax evaded number as the case proceeds
through the process (CI to DOJ Tax to United States Attorneys’ Office
(USAO)), but the key is to start the process as early as possible.  It helps
for the CI special agent to not include a higher loss in his calculations to
start with because later players in the process may not be likely to recon-
sider that decision.
2. Get the Criminal Tax Number as Low as Possible
The criminal number is the evaded taxes provable beyond a reasona-
ble doubt for the counts of prosecution.  If the Government has to or does
introduce in the case in chief a tax evaded figure, it should be the criminal
number for the crimes having evaded taxes as an element.  Early in the
investigation, you should try to drive down that number.  If that number
comes down enough, the Government may decide not to prosecute.  At a
minimum, by driving the number down, the practitioner can positively af-
fect any ultimate sentence that may be imposed.
Practitioners need a good investigative team, including a forensic tax
accountant, to try to get the numbers down.  One avenue to pursue is the
opportunity offered by James v. United States65 and its progeny, to exclude
from the criminal equation tax items as to which the law does not offer
sufficiently clear guidance that it can be the subject of criminal prosecu-
tion.66  The willful element of most tax crimes requires “intentional viola-
62. See USAM, supra note 9, § 6-4.125.  This section, titled “IRS Transmittal of
United States Attorney’s Recommendation, Special Agent’s and Criminal Tax
Counsel’s Reports, and Exhibits from Grand Jury Investigation,” provides:
When a grand jury investigation is complete and the United States Attor-
ney concludes that the Government has gathered sufficient evidence to
proceed with prosecution, the United States Attorney should request that
the special agent assigned to the matter prepare a SAR.  After the SAR is
completed, the special agent should request that CT Counsel review the
SAR and prepare a CEM.  Then, the SAC must forward the SAR, with
copies of the relevant exhibits, and the CEM to the Tax Division for re-
view and authorization.
Id.
63. Everyone from the IRS participating in any way in the grand jury investiga-
tion must be subject to the secrecy requirement of Rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(2)(B).
64. At this stage, the taxpayer is not yet a defendant.  I refer to the taxpayer as
defendant only for consistency in the reference throughout the Article.
65. 366 U.S. 213 (1961).
66. See generally id.; see also United States v. Dahlstrom, 713 F.2d 1423, 1429
(9th Cir. 1983); United States v. Garber, 607 F.2d 92, 98–99 (5th Cir. 1979) (en
banc); United States v. Critzer, 498 F.2d 1160, 1163 (4th Cir. 1974).  The CTM
17
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tion of a known legal duty.”67  This means that, at an objective level, the
duty must be knowable and, at a subjective level, the defendant must know
of the knowable duty.
3. Get the Tax Loss as Low as Possible
The Guidelines provide that the calculation can include relevant con-
duct, such as the tax loss for years other than the years of conviction and
tax loss resulting from conduct the defendant aided or abetted or con-
spired to commit.68  Relevant conduct may be included in loss from (i)
uncharged conduct (both state and federal taxes), (ii) charged conduct of
which the defendant was acquitted, and (iii) conduct beyond the criminal
statute of limitations.69
For example, assume that, through a common pattern, the taxpayer
commits tax evasion for years one through six, evading $100,000 in each
year.  The Government indicts him on April 14 of year nine, charging tax
evasion (under section 7201) for all open years three to six (open years is
a statute of limitations concept).  The Government cannot indict for years
one and two.  Assume that the taxpayer pleads guilty to two counts of tax
evasion for years five and six.  The tax loss for purposes of setting the BOL
is $600,000.  And, this result is not changed even if, for example, the jury
determines guilt (rather than by plea) for the two years and then deter-
mines that, for the remaining years charged, the Government did not
prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt (i.e., the jury acquits the defen-
dant).70  What this means is that the defendant rides up the scale, gets a
higher BOL, and a greater advisory sentencing range, as a result of con-
duct for which he was not convicted.
Indeed, this phenomenon can result in the BOL being the same in
many plea situations where counts are dropped, as compared to going to
trial and being convicted on all counts.  In these situations, except for the
acceptance of responsibility downward adjustment and possibly a section
5K1 substantial assistance adjustment, the defendant will get no benefit
from the Government’s plea concession in dropping counts or not includ-
ing counts in the first place.
Relevant conduct is negotiable because the relevance of the conduct
outside the count(s) of conviction depends a lot upon perspective and
bargaining dynamics.  If the CI agents do not determine the relevant con-
duct during the investigation, for whatever reason (including lack of re-
provides prosecutors with arguments to blunt what I call the James defense. See
DOJ CTM, supra note 9, § 8.08[2] (“When the underlying tax law at issue in a case
is vague or highly debatable, it may be difficult, if not impossible, to prove that a
defendant acted willfully.”).
67. Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 201 (1991).
68. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.3 (2013) (providing sec-
tion titled “Relevant Conduct (Factors that Determine the Guideline Range)”).
69. See, e.g., United States v. Maken, 510 F.3d 654, 657–58 (6th Cir. 2007).
70. See United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 154 (1997).
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sources), then the conduct would not be counted.71  And, even if the CI
agents do determine relevant conduct, perhaps the prosecutors can be
talked into perceiving less relevance to the conduct or reducing the num-
bers in order to achieve a plea.  But, it is important to make this attempt as
early and often as possible, rather than leaving it for determination in a
sentencing hearing.  And, of course, the defendant should not in the pro-
cess agree to a tax loss number that the defendant is not willing to live
with.72
I share an anecdote.  In one of the first criminal prosecutions I han-
dled under the Guidelines, I was trying to convince the Assistant United
States Attorney (AUSA) that the Government should not prosecute, by
trying to create doubt as to willfulness.  He listened politely but then said
my arguments as to the client’s lack of willfulness were unconvincing.  He
said I would be better off to “work the numbers hard.”  Our team did that.
The numbers fell by over two-thirds from the original SAR, at least for
purposes of reaching a plea agreement that the client would accept.73  As
a result, the client was given six months of home confinement, substan-
tially lighter than the pre-Booker, virtually mandatory incarceration that
would have been required if the sentencing court had adopted the special
agent’s original calculation of the tax loss.74
I mentioned in the anecdote that we reached an agreement as to the
reduced tax loss in the plea agreement.  Perhaps 90%, more or less, of tax
crimes cases are resolved by plea agreement.  The process of reaching the
71. This omission of otherwise relevant conduct occurs often where the pat-
tern of conduct persisted over a number of years.  Say a taxpayer convicted of
failure to file for four years that were open when indicted has not filed for the
twenty preceding years.  For resource and other reasons (perhaps not wanting to
appear to be piling on or overpopulate the jails by longer sentences), the relevant
conduct presented for sentencing may be from zero to perhaps two or three years,
but not the entire twenty years for which determining the loss would require devo-
tion of resources disproportionate to the criminal enforcement needs (the limited
number of years will suffice).  The same is true for a pattern of evasion for filed
returns.
72. See United States v. Yooho Weon, 722 F.3d 583, 590 (4th Cir. 2013) (hold-
ing defendant to plea agreement tax loss of $2,400,000, despite his later claim at
sentencing that tax loss was really $40,000 and rejecting argument that, even if
stipulated amount is binding for sentencing, lower tax loss amount can be consid-
ered under section 3553(a) and Booker); see also Jack Townsend, Fourth Circuit Holds
Defendant to His Tax Loss Stipulated in the Plea Agreement, FED. TAX CRIMES BLOG (July
24, 2013, 1:50 PM), http://federaltaxcrimes.blogspot.com/2013/07/fourth-cir-
cuit-holds-defendant-to-his.html.
73. All of the numbers were good civil tax numbers (tax deficiency).  Where
we succeeded was in moving the key two-thirds from the tax evaded category be-
cause we convinced the AUSA that he would not be able to prove that the taxpayer
intended evasion and the components of the two-thirds so moved.
74. Now, if we could have lopped off, say one-half of the remaining one-third
of the tax loss, perhaps we could have convinced the Government that there was
not enough tax evaded to pursue the criminal case at all.  But, we just could not
get there.  This was pre-Booker; I suspect that, with Booker, we would have gotten a
sentencing equivalent of this benefit.
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agreement is the last time in most tax cases to really work the numbers.
Without getting into the details of the dynamics of the plea process, suffice
it to say that prosecutors have systemic pressures to resolve cases by plea.
Pleas are deals; in the deal metaphor, there must be a willing buyer and a
willing seller.  The plea has to be sweet enough that the defendant will
agree, and one way to sweeten the pot is to get the tax loss sufficiently low
so that the taxpayer’s Guidelines range is as low as possible.  This dynamic
may assist the AUSA in a revelation that, well, some material component
item(s) of income, deduction, or credit in the prior calculations of the tax
loss number, involve civil issues rather than criminal.75  There may be
other items considered in the plea negotiations as to which the AUSA can
have properly guided revelations favorable to the defendant, but the tax
loss is the most obvious.
4. Presumptions, Extrapolations, and Guesses in Computing Tax Loss
a. Presumptions
The Guidelines require certain presumptions as to the amount of the
tax loss “unless a more accurate determination of the tax loss can be
made.”76  To illustrate, in the case of an individual filing a fraudulent re-
turn, those presumptions are: 28% of unreported income or improperly
claimed deductions, plus the full amount of false tax credits.77
In the case of individual failure to file, the tax loss is “the amount of
tax that the taxpayer owed and did not pay.”78  In making the tax loss
calculation, in the absence of “a more accurate determination,” the pre-
75. In this process, the risk is that (i) the probation officer in the Pre-sen-
tence Report (PSR) may recommend higher numbers than agreed in the plea
agreement or that (ii) the sentencing judge may do so sua sponte.  These are risks
that, for a number of reasons, virtually never become a reality.  I do note in the
text below an example where the sentencing judge did intervene on the tax loss
stipulated in the plea agreement and recommended by the probation officer, but
when you read the example you will realize that it was a situation where the sen-
tencing court easily determined that, if the tax loss definition said that, that defini-
tion was an ass. See CHARLES DICKENS, OLIVER TWIST 204 (1839) (noting famously
that “the law is an ass”).  The court did not have to follow the aberrant conclusion
to the lowest sentence possible.  Rather, the court could fix it by a different inter-
pretation of tax loss or, if necessary, by the discretion to vary upward under section
3553(a) and Booker. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012); United States v. Booker, 543
U.S. 220, 222 (2005).
76. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2T1.1(c)(1)(A)–(C) (2013); see
also id. § 2T1.1 cmt. n.1 (“In these situations, the ‘presumptions’ set forth are to be
used unless the government or defense provides sufficient information for a more
accurate assessment of the tax loss.”).
77. Id. § 2T1.1(c)(1)(A)–(C).
78. Id. § 2T1.1(c)(2).  I discuss a case later in this Article where this definition
was critical to permit a taxpayer, who was at the center of a failure to pay over
withheld taxes, to claim the credit and thus reduce tax due for withheld taxes not
actually paid over.
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sumption is: 20% of the gross income, less tax withheld or otherwise
paid.79
The calculation of the net tax due (tax less payments) is the criminal
figure concept, which excludes anything that the taxpayer could not have
had an intent to evade (i.e., it is not the unpaid civil tax liability/defi-
ciency).  There may be an opportunity to lower the tax loss in some cases
by arguing that the taxpayer had no intent to evade as to some or all of the
tax loss the Government seeks to apply.  To illustrate, I gave the example
above where there were two components of omitted income—embezzle-
ment income, clearly taxable, and personal injury income, not sufficiently
certain of taxation that it should be included.  In the case of fraudulent
return evasion, the latter component would be excluded from the evaded
tax calculation.  Now apply that to a failure to file a return where those two
items were the only components of gross income and the 20% presump-
tion would apply.  You could assert that the 20% should only apply to that
component of income—embezzlement income—that was sufficiently cer-
tain of taxation under the same standard.  In other words, it is not the tax
deficiency, but the lower tax evaded amount.80
The Government, of course, has the burden to establish the tax loss at
sentencing, but these presumptions may kick in to meet that burden if the
taxpayer fails to produce a more accurate calculation.81  Keep in mind,
however, that as noted above, the percentage assumptions apply to the
items that meet the historic definition of criminal conduct—evaded tax—
and thus should not apply to those items historically excluded in deter-
mining the criminal figure.  The discussion immediately above related to
failure to file is instructive, because it is also applicable in other contexts.
Moreover, in some cases, the Government will want to present the more
accurate determination to generate a higher tax loss than the presump-
tion might generate.
79. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2T1.1(c)(2)(A).
80. I made this genre of argument in an early case involving a failure to file
syndrome defense to a section 7203 charge where the taxpayer’s income was re-
ported on W-2s and 1099s, thus assuring that the IRS would know of the income
and, eventually, it would be resolved.  At least, that was my story and I stuck to it.
In effect, as to any unpaid tax, the taxpayer was just deferring but not evading his
tax liability, and the tax loss concept goes to evasion and not to deferring.  One of
the arguments I made to the AUSA was that, on this basis, even if the Government
got a conviction, it may end up getting no incarceration because the tax loss might
be zero.  The potential for incarceration is an important factor in determining
whether the Government should indict.  Whether for that reason or some other
(that I did not know about), the AUSA returned the case to DOJ Tax without
indictment.
81. See generally United States v. Sullivan, 255 F.3d 1256 (10th Cir. 2001) (illus-
trating example of reliance on presumption involving earlier Guideline where pre-
sumption was 20%).
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b. Extrapolations and Guesses
The Government may attempt to use extrapolations that it thinks are
persuasive to a court in determining a reasonable tax loss for sentencing.
This often occurs, for example, in a prosecution of tax preparers who have
prepared many fraudulent returns.  The Government may audit only a
small portion of the returns prepared by the preparer but will then at-
tempt statistical extrapolation for a sentencing tax loss larger than the
sampled returns.  The use of such extrapolations has been addressed only
infrequently by the courts, but the logical rule that has developed is that, if
persuasive, this type of evidence can be used.82  By contrast, guesses that
do not have a firm basis in logic and reasonableness will not be
accepted.83
5. Unclaimed Deductions and Credits
Courts have divided over whether a defendant’s tax loss can account
for unclaimed deductions (i.e., deductions that the defendant did not
claim on the return the taxpayer filed or deductions that were never
claimed because the defendant did not file a return).  The issue turns
upon the respective courts’ interpretations of the general definition of tax
loss—the tax that was the object of the defendant’s criminal tax offense.  I
will not get into the interpretations that split the courts over the years,
because the Sentencing Guidelines have recently been revised, effective
November 1, 2013, to provide the courts uniform guidance on the issue.84
The interpretation, effective November 1, 2013, is reflected in Appli-
cation Note 1.  The amendment to the Application Note is:
82. See, e.g., United States v. Ahanmisi, 324 F. App’x 258, 260 (4th Cir. 2009)
(involving tax preparer sentencing in which, at Government’s request, tax loss was
projection to total universe of returns prepared from sample of returns).  The
Court of Appeals reversed on the ground that the sample was not random and thus
could not be the basis for an inference that it represented the universe. See id.  In
another case, the Fourth Circuit later sustained a sentencing court’s extrapolation.
See United States v. Mehta, 594 F.3d 277, 283–84 (4th Cir. 2010).  Even though the
sampling was not random (a baseline requirement for statistically valid extrapola-
tions to the universe), the error was harmless because the tax loss determined by
the sentencing court was reasonable under the facts. See id.  The Fourth Circuit
distinguished Mehta from Ahanmisi by stating that, unlike in Mehta, the sentencing
court in Ahanmisi was unable to compensate for the skewed sample. See id. at
283–84; see also id. at 284–85 (Shedd, J., concurring); United States v. Simmons,
420 F. App’x 414, 418 (5th Cir. 2011) (focusing on reasonableness of
extrapolations).
83. See Ahanmisi, 324 F. App’x at 260.
84. Any readers interested in the pre-amendment split among the circuits can
consult various sources, including prior editions of my book, available on SSRN,
for discussion of this issue. See John A. Townsend, Federal Tax Crimes (Working
Paper, 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2212771.  Also, I have dis-
cussed the issue in my Federal Tax Crimes Blog, in posts published prior to the
date of the Amendment. See generally Jack Townsend, FED. TAX CRIMES BLOG,
http://federaltaxcrimes.blogspot.com.
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3. Unclaimed Credits, Deductions, and Exemptions.—In deter-
mining the tax loss, the court should account for the standard
deduction and personal and dependent exemptions to which the
defendant was entitled.  In addition, the court should account
for any unclaimed credit, deduction, or exemption that is
needed to ensure a reasonable estimate of the tax loss, but only
to the extent that (A) the credit, deduction, or exemption was
related to the tax offense and could have been claimed at the
time the tax offense was committed; (B) the credit, deduction, or
exemption is reasonably and practicably ascertainable; and (C)
the defendant presents information to support the credit, deduc-
tion, or exemption sufficiently in advance of sentencing to pro-
vide an adequate opportunity to evaluate whether it has sufficient
indicia of reliability to support its probable accuracy.
However, the court shall not account for payments to third par-
ties made in a manner that encouraged or facilitated a separate
violation of law (e.g., “under the table” payments to employees or
expenses incurred to obstruct justice).
The burden is on the defendant to establish any such credit, de-
duction, or exemption by a preponderance of the evidence.85
The Commission’s reasons for the amendment (the legislative history,
if you will):
This amendment reflects the Commission’s view that considera-
tion of legitimate unclaimed credits, deductions, or exemptions,
subject to certain limitations and exclusions, is most consistent
with existing provisions regarding the calculation of tax loss in
§ 2T1.1.
The new application note first provides that courts should always
account for the standard deduction and personal and dependent
exemptions to which the defendant was entitled.  The Commis-
sion received public comment and testimony that such deduc-
tions and exemptions are commonly considered and accepted by
the government during the course of its investigation and during
the course of plea negotiations.  Consistent with this standard
practice, the Commission determined that accounting for these
generally undisputed and readily verifiable deductions and ex-
emptions where they are not previously claimed (most commonly
where the offense involves a failure to file a tax return) is
appropriate.
85. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, Amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines (Apr. 30,
2013), http://www.ussc.gov/Legal/Amendments/Reader-Friendly/20130430_RF_
Amendments.pdf [hereinafter Amendments to Sentencing Guidelines] (citations omit-
ted) (compiling unofficial text of amendments); see also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDE-
LINES MANUAL § 2T1.1 cmt. n.1 (2013).
23
Townsend: Tax Evaded in the Federal Tax Crimes Sentencing Process and Beyon
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2014
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLR\59-3\VLR306.txt unknown Seq: 24 14-AUG-14 15:02
622 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59: p. 599
The new application note further provides that courts should
also account for any other previously unclaimed credit, deduc-
tion, or exemption that is needed to ensure a reasonable esti-
mate of the tax loss, but only to the extent certain conditions are
met.  First, the credit, deduction, or exemption must be one that
was related to the tax offense and could have been claimed at the
time the tax offense was committed.  This condition reflects the
Commission’s determination that a defendant should not be per-
mitted to invoke unforeseen or after-the-fact changes or charac-
terizations—such as offsetting losses that occur before or after
the relevant tax year or substituting a more advantageous depre-
ciation method or filing status—to lower the tax loss.  To permit
a defendant to optimize his return in this manner would unjustly
reward defendants, and could require unjustifiable speculation
and complexity at the sentencing hearing.
Second, the otherwise unclaimed credit, deduction, or exemp-
tion must be reasonably and practicably ascertainable.  Consis-
tent with the instruction in Application Note 1, this condition
reaffirms the Commission’s position that sentencing courts need
only make a reasonable estimate of tax loss.  In this regard, the
Commission recognized that consideration of some unclaimed
credits, deductions, or exemptions could require sentencing
courts to make unnecessarily complex tax determinations, and
therefore concluded that limiting consideration of unclaimed
credits, deductions, or exemptions to those that are reasonably
and practicably ascertainable is appropriate.
Third, the defendant must present information to support the
credit, deduction, or exemption sufficiently in advance of sen-
tencing to provide an adequate opportunity to evaluate whether
it has sufficient indicia of reliability to support its probable accu-
racy.  Consistent with the principles set forth in § 6A1.3 . . . this
condition ensures that the parties have an adequate opportunity
to present information relevant to the court’s consideration of
any unclaimed credits, deductions, or exemptions raised at
sentencing.
In addition, the new application note provides that certain cate-
gories of credits, deductions, or exemptions shall not be consid-
ered by the court in any case.  In particular, “the court shall not
account for payments to third parties made in a manner that en-
couraged or facilitated a separate violation of law (e.g., ‘under
the table’ payments to employees or expenses incurred to ob-
struct justice).”  The Commission determined that payments
made in this manner result in additional harm to the tax system
and the legal system as a whole.  Therefore, to use them to re-
duce the tax loss would unjustifiably benefit the defendant and
24
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would result in a tax loss figure that understates the seriousness
of the offense and the culpability of the defendant.
Finally, the application note makes clear that the burden is on
the defendant to establish any credit, deduction, or exemption
permitted under this new application note by a preponderance
of the evidence, which is also consistent with the commentary in
§ 6A1.3.86
I am not sure that, given the opening paragraph, the Commission
makes a compelling case for excluding unclaimed deductions or credits
that are not related to the criminal offense.  Can or should it be that the
measure of punishment is not based on the real tax number rather than a
notional one calculated by ignoring unclaimed deductions?  I think that
depends upon one’s concept of fairness and the goal of making the pun-
ishment fit the crime.  And, of course, to the extent that unrelated deduc-
tions might materially reduce or eliminate the real tax deficiency, I think
the court could have Booker discretion to make some adjustment in the
final sentence.
One thing to consider early in the process is whether to file an
amended return claiming the previously unclaimed, unrelated deduc-
tions.  In order to do that, of course, the taxpayer will effectively admit the
omitted income or overstated deductions and credits that generated the
IRS’s interest in the first place.  But, if the unclaimed deductions or credits
are large enough, it may thwart either a civil agent referral to CI or a CI
referral to DOJ Tax.  These types of strategies must be planned by exper-
ienced attorneys aware of all the risks they entail.
6. Corporate Diversions to Shareholders
a. The Unclaimed Compensation Deduction Issue
In situations where the taxpayer cheats on taxes through a closely
held “C Corporation,” there will be the double level tax loss to consider.
For example, if a taxpayer diverts gross income from the corporation to
himself without reporting the income by either of them, the corporation
will have evaded tax and the taxpayer will also have evaded tax.  Both levels
of unpaid tax can be included in the tax loss for the shareholder as defen-
dant.  A frequent gambit in order to avoid including the corporate level
tax in the tax loss is to urge that the constructive payment from the corpo-
ration to the shareholder was really additional deductible compensation,
entitling the corporation to a deduction, thus producing no corporate
level tax loss.  The courts generally reject that argument, for the corpora-
tion did not in fact pay the amount as salary.87  And, even if that hurdle is
86. Amendments to Sentencing Guidelines, supra note 85, cmt. (explaining reason
for amendment).
87. See, e.g., United States v. Gordon, 291 F.3d 181, 187 (2d Cir. 2002); United
States v. Martinez-Rios, 143 F.3d 662, 671 (2d Cir. 1998).
25
Townsend: Tax Evaded in the Federal Tax Crimes Sentencing Process and Beyon
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2014
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLR\59-3\VLR306.txt unknown Seq: 26 14-AUG-14 15:02
624 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59: p. 599
cleared, the use of the deduction to lower the tax loss will have to pass
muster under the new unclaimed deductions rule.  It probably would
where, as posited, the defendant’s shareholder level tax is alleged as
evaded tax.
b. The Dividend Issue
Treating the transaction as a constructive receipt by the corporation
and distribution to the shareholder is pretty much a no-brainer from a
civil tax perspective.  However, complexity may lie in how the distribution
is taxed to the shareholder.  Under the Code, a corporate distribution is
taxed to the shareholder as a dividend only to the extent of the corpora-
tion’s cumulative or current earnings (E&P).  The balance of the distribu-
tion, if any, is taxed either as a nontaxable return of capital to the extent
of basis in the stock, or a capital gain to the extent of the excess of the
distribution over basis.88  These determinations require that E&P be calcu-
lated.  Therein lies the potential problem/opportunity.
Without getting into the complexities of determining E&P, suffice it
to say here that E&P can be very difficult to calculate.89  Since the Novem-
ber 2001 Guidelines, the difficulties inherent in E&P are resolved by per-
mitting presumptions to apply (34% of diverted amount at corporate level
and 28% at individual level).90  In the tax loss calculations, the amount of
the corporate diversion is taxed to the corporation and in full to the divert-
ing shareholder without reduction for the corporate tax and without any
other E&P calculations.
The really troubling point is that the presumption can create a tax
loss for sentencing purposes where proper analysis of E&P could show
that, in fact, there was no tax evaded at the shareholder level.  Indeed, in
the restitution calculation or the civil case usually following after convic-
tion, it may well be that the taxpayer can establish for civil tax purposes
(where the truth,91 and not presumptions, control) that there is no divi-
dend and no shareholder level tax.92  Should our criminal tax system re-
quire that sentencing be driven by presumptions inconsistent with the
truth (or more precisely, without regard to truth)?
Finally, there may still be some play in the E&P issue at the guilt deter-
mination phase.  Remember that in a tax evasion case the Government
must prove tax evaded beyond a reasonable doubt.  What if a foray into
the murky swamp of E&P could show that there is really no shareholder
level tax or, if there were such a tax, it was not material or it is too murky
88. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 301, 316 (2012).
89. See, e.g., BORIS I. BITTKER & JAMES S. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION
OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS, ch. 8 (7th ed. 2000).
90. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2T1.1 cmt. n.7 (2013).
91. At least the truth based on the evidence presented.
92. I note below that there may be a problem if the tax loss gross of the de-
ductions were included in the restitution amount, but presumably restitution is not
subject to the potential denial of reduction for unclaimed deductions.
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to know beyond a reasonable doubt?  There is no such presumption that
the Government can rely upon in the guilt determination phase.93
7. Timing Issues
On the original return, a taxpayer may have improperly claimed a tax
benefit (deduction or credit) that he is entitled to in a later year.  This is
sometimes referred to as a timing difference.  The issue is how the tax loss
in the improper earlier year is to be calculated and, specifically, whether
the amount of the tax loss is adjusted downward in that year to account for
the fact that the taxpayer may have not claimed the deduction in the later
proper year.  To take an extreme case, assume that a defendant improp-
erly claimed a $1,000 deduction in year one that he is entitled to take in
year two but does not claim in year two.  Assume further that the tax saved
by claiming the deduction, focusing only on year one, is $250 (actual) or
$280 (presumptive).  But, is that the real loss to the Government because
the Government will make that up in year two when the taxpayer does not
claim the deduction?94  In the bare facts given, what is the real tax loss?  It
is not $250 (actual) or $280 (presumptive), but rather (assuming constant
or materially the same marginal rates), it is zero, except for, perhaps, the
time value of money for that short one-year timing period.  Normally, ex-
cept in collection evasion cases, the time value of money is not considered
in calculating the tax loss.
In the only opinion to address the issue, United States v. Stadtmauer,95
the timing issue was in the context of depreciation where a current deduc-
tion was claimed for items that could be depreciated over future years.96
The Government wanted to apply the 28% presumptive rate to the entire
deduction claimed without any mitigation for the future tax revenue the
Government did or would collect.97  The defendant cried foul and the
court listened.  The court opined:
Mr. Stadtmauer argues that since the issue is only one of timing
there is no tax loss associated with these deductions.  The Gov-
ernment disagrees, arguing that there is at [ ] least a loss due to
the time value of money.  However, the Government does not
argue that the loss is the time value of money, rather the Govern-
93. See United States v. Bok, 156 F.3d 157, 163–64 (2d Cir. 1998).  The defen-
dant will likely have to put the issue in play by meeting some type of production
burden. See id.
94. Note that there is a real sweet civil mitigation issue that could be ad-
dressed here if the defendant were to attempt to deduct the same item in year two,
but let us not get bogged down in noncriminal matters here because I assume that
the defendant did not claim the deduction in year two.  The civil mitigation rules
are found in 26 U.S.C. §§ 1311–1314 (2012).
95. No. 05-249, 2009 WL 361113 (D.N.J. Feb. 9, 2009), aff’d, 620 F.3d 238 (3d
Cir. 2010).
96. See generally id.
97. See id. at *12.
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ment argues that because there is some loss due to the time value
of money the 28% presumptive rate should be used.  This Court
agrees with the Government that the time value of money should
be considered as a tax loss, but disagrees that using the 28% rate
is appropriate; the 28% rate does not “fit the circumstances” for
these deductions.
The Court recognizes, and the Government conceded at the sen-
tencing hearing, that as a general matter, tax loss under the
Guidelines for the crimes at issue here does not include interest
and penalties.  The Court also recognizes that interest calcula-
tions are meant to account for the time value of money, so argua-
bly any interest based calculation should not be included under
the Guidelines.  But, the Court also finds that recognizing a time
value of money effect for these deductions is completely different
than the general case of calculating and adding interest, as ad-
dressed in Application Note 1.  Under § 2T1.1(c), “the tax loss is
the amount of loss that was the object of the offense.”  Here, the
purpose of taking the deductions in full in the year incurred was
to receive the time value of money benefit from paying less taxes
now rather than spread over time; it was not merely some ancil-
lary benefit to the primary object of avoiding taxes by taking a
deduction that was not permissible at all, the time value of
money benefit was the object of the offense.
The question, then, is what is a reasonable way to estimate this
loss.  As noted above, to accept the presumptive 28% rate as the
Government argues would be unfair and drastically overstate the
tax loss.  The Court finds that the most reasonable way to ac-
count for this loss is by using the Government’s own method for
compensating itself for the time value of money related to under-
payments of tax.  Interest on underpayments is calculated by the
IRS pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 6621(a)(2).  This rate is determined
quarterly.  For the years 1997 to 2001, the IRS rate for non-corpo-
rate underpayments varied between 7% and 9%, with the rate
declining in the years after 2001.  This Court finds that using a
rate of 8%, a rate in the middle of the range, is reasonable.  This
approach is not perfect.  It does not account for compounding,
but it also does not account for the exact timing of the deduc-
tions.  However, exact precision is not required.  This Court finds
that the other methods suggested either understate or overstate
the intended loss and that this method is the most fair and rea-
sonable estimate of the loss intended for these items.98
This is a creative solution to the problem.
98. Id. at *15–16 (citations omitted).
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8. Tax Loss Numbers from Others’ Conduct (Related or Joint Criminal
Activity)
a. General
The concept of relevant conduct includes criminally related harm at-
tributable to the conduct of others with whom the defendant had a rela-
tionship of the type that would normally make the defendant criminally
liable for crimes committed by another.99  The first type of relevant con-
duct is defined as “all acts and omissions committed, aided, abetted, coun-
seled, commanded, induced, procured, or willfully caused by the
defendant . . . .”100  We have already considered the “committed” concept
whereby tax loss can include conduct of a defendant for non-conviction
years.  The remainder of the quoted conduct describes standard criminal
concepts of aiding, abetting, and causing incorporated in 18 U.S.C. § 2,
which make a defendant criminally liable even if the defendant is not oth-
erwise guilty of the crime.101
The second type of relevant conduct includes: “[I]n the case of a
jointly undertaken criminal activity (a criminal plan, scheme, endeavor, or
enterprise undertaken by the defendant in concert with others, whether
or not charged as a conspiracy), all reasonably foreseeable acts and omis-
sions of others in furtherance of the jointly undertaken criminal
activity . . . .”102
This second type is technically, as worded, related to the concept of
conspiracy but is actually drawn more narrowly than the criminal concept
of conspiracy.  However, subject to the caveat that it may not always be the
same, it probably is substantially coterminous in most cases.103
99. The consideration of relevant conduct is consistent with section 3661,
which provides: “No limitation shall be placed on the information concerning the
background, character, and conduct of a person convicted of an offense which a
court of the United States may receive and consider for the purpose of imposing
an appropriate sentence.”  18 U.S.C. § 3661 (2012).
100. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.3(a)(1)(A) (2013).
101. See John A. Townsend, Theories of Criminal Liability for Tax Evasion (2012),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2060496.
102. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B).  There is some
conceptual overlap between at least some type of conduct that could be viewed as
aiding and abetting and conduct that is viewed as within the scope of a conspiracy.
I do not think there is any practical significance to such nuance in the context of
this discussion.
103. For those wanting the nuance on this, obviously the starting point is the
language of the Guideline itself.  Then, the Guideline provides useful examples.
See id. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B); id. § 1B1.3 cmt. 2 (discussing concepts in some detail).
The CTM also discusses the concepts. See DOJ CTM, supra note 9, § 43.04.  In a
Simplification Draft Paper for discussion purposes, the U.S. Sentencing Commis-
sion wrote the following as the view of the training staff about this provision:
[B]ecause the Commission defined sentencing liability for conspiracies
more narrowly than traditional criminal law conspiratorial liability and
because the Commission’s definition of sentencing liability for conspira-
cies is intricate and fact specific, the training staff believes that applying
this definition has been a struggle for attorneys, probation officers, and
29
Townsend: Tax Evaded in the Federal Tax Crimes Sentencing Process and Beyon
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2014
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLR\59-3\VLR306.txt unknown Seq: 30 14-AUG-14 15:02
628 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59: p. 599
In each of these cases, some additional nexus to the tax loss harm is
required,104 but for purposes of this outline, these nuances are not mate-
rial.  Suffice it to say that tax loss within the scope of a tax conspiracy—
that is reasonably foreseeable—will be included as relevant conduct.  A
good rule of thumb is that the reasonably foreseeable tax loss from the
time the defendant joins the conspiracy until the defendant effectively
withdraws from the conspiracy will be included.105
For example, if an object of the conspiracy is to have the participants
not report their illegal income, all conspirators’ tax loss numbers will be
relevant conduct.106  Similarly, if the conspiracy is to promote illegal tax
shelters, the tax loss numbers for the taxpayers—whether active partici-
pants in the conspiracy or not—will be included.
Even if the defendant in question is not indicted for conspiracy, the
tax loss from “jointly undertaken criminal activity” can be included if
proved by a preponderance of the evidence.107  Such activity will usually
courts since the advent of the guidelines.  Specifically, unlike criminal
conspiratorial liability, relevant conduct limits sentencing conspiratorial
liability to “jointly undertaken criminal activity.”  This prong of relevant
conduct often requires courts to hold significant hearings to determine
what part of a defendant’s criminal law conspiratorial liability “the partic-
ular defendant agreed to jointly undertake (i.e., the scope of the specific
conduct and objectives embraced by the defendant’s agreement)” as well
as all reasonably foreseeable conduct of others in furtherance of the
jointly undertaken activity.  [U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL
§ 1B1.3 cmt. n.2 (2013).]  Because this determination is case- and fact-
specific, and because the determination can drive a guideline sentence, it
is litigated in many cases.  Commission research shows that after the drug
guideline, relevant conduct is the most frequently appealed guideline is-
sue.  These data further show that most of the appeals surround the defi-
nition of conspiratorial liability.
U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, RELEVANT CONDUCT AND REAL OFFENSE SENTENCING
(simplification draft paper), available at http://www.ussc.gov/Research/Working_
Group_Reports/Simplification/RELEVANT.HTM (last visited June 1, 2014).
104. See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.3(a)(2) (2013).
The Guidelines require that the relevant conduct be “part of the same course of
conduct or common scheme or plan as the offense of conviction” and that it be
groupable, under section 3D1.2, with the counts of conviction had the defendant
been convicted of the relevant conduct. Id. § 1B1.3(a)(2); see also id. § 1B1.3 cmt.
n.8.
105. See id. § 1B1.3 cmt. n.2 (last paragraph); see also Grunewald v. United
States, 353 U.S. 391, 401–02 (1957) (addressing scope of conspiracy, specifically as
to whether subsequent acts after main object of conspiracy are within scope of
conspiracy).
106. See, e.g., United States v. Gricco, 277 F.3d 339, 356–58 (3d Cir. 2002).
107. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.3 cmt. n.2 (2013).  As to the
general proposition that sentencing factors need to be proved only by a prepon-
derance of the evidence, the CTM cautions, “the Supreme Court has specifically
left open the question whether, under exceptional circumstances in which the sen-
tencing enhancement was ‘a tail which wags the dog of the substantive offense,’
due process might require the relevant conduct to be proven by clear and convinc-
ing evidence.” DOJ CTM, supra note 9, § 43.04 (quoting United States v. Watts,
519 U.S. 148, 156–57 n.2 (1997)).
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fit the definition of a conspiracy108 and, as a result, the Government will
usually indict for conspiracy109 and, in tax cases, will usually require a plea
to the conspiracy count in a plea agreement.
So, generally, there is a huge potential downside to being convicted of
tax conspiracy.  In this regard, in the major tax shelter prosecutions, the
prosecutors were quick to point out to persons within the potential scope
of the criminal investigations (referred to as subjects, but also including
targets) that the intended losses from the conspiracy were in the billions—
meaning, at least in terms of sentencing, the Guidelines range calculation
was to be as high as it gets.  And, when the prosecutors first started this
mantra, the Guidelines were considered binding rather than just advisory
as a result of Booker.  Judges could still depart, and no one representing
criminal defendants really believed that a judge would sentence based on
those Guideline ranges without a departure to achieve better justice.  Still,
it was a risk that could not be ignored.  So, as to how one of these defend-
ants attempted to mitigate the risk, see the next section of this Article.
b. Is There a Tax Loss Benefit to a Conspiracy Conviction?
I illustrate here a possible benefit with the right plea in tax cases.  I
noted above that conspiracy charges are often encountered in tax cases
and in federal criminal cases generally.  And, in the plea process, the con-
spiracy charge is often considered the major count under DOJ Tax’s major
count policy.110  Under that policy, a defendant may be offered a single
plea, frequently the conspiracy plea, with dismissal of the substantive
counts.  The tax conspiracy Guideline is section 2T1.9, which establishes a
BOL of ten or, if higher, the BOL from the regular tax Guideline in sec-
tion 2T1.1 under the tax loss table.  But, if the count of conviction is solely
for the tax conspiracy and not for any substantive tax crime (such as eva-
sion), section 2T1.1 may have no application because of the definition of
tax loss in section 2T1.1.
This counterintuitive opportunity played out in United States v. Co-
plan,111 involving a major prosecution of several defendants for Son-of-
Boss fraudulent tax shelters.112  The sentencing court found that the con-
spiracy intended $400 million in tax loss from the taxpayers to whom the
conspirators sold the shelters.  However, apparently because the defen-
108. For this purpose, there is no practical distinction between the offense
conspiracy and the Klein defraud conspiracy.  In both cases, it is the tax loss that is
the object of the conspiracy—in conspiracy lingo, within the scope of the conspir-
acy—that is included.
109. See United States v. Reynolds, 919 F.2d 435, 439 (7th Cir. 1990).  Judge
Easterbrook lamented in a tax case (but for federal criminal charges generally),
that the federal conspiracy charge is “inevitable because prosecutors seem to have
conspiracy on their word processors as Count I; rare is the case omitting such a
charge.” Id.
110. See DOJ CTM, supra note 9, § 5.01[1]; USAM, supra note 9, § 6-4.310.
111. 703 F.3d 46 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 71 (2013).
112. See id. at 92–94.
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dant in question, Bolton, pled only to the conspiracy count, the prosecu-
tors stipulated in the plea agreement that there was no tax loss and the
probation office’s PSR also concluded that there was no loss.  That conclu-
sion was based on a literal interpretation of tax loss in section 2T1.1(c)(1)
of the Guidelines, which defines tax loss as follows: “If the offense involved
tax evasion or a fraudulent or false return, statement, or other document, the tax
loss is the total amount of loss that was the object of the offense (i.e., the
loss that would have resulted had the offense been successfully
completed).”113
The offense referred to is the offense of conviction.  The offense of
conviction was conspiracy and, hence, not included in the definition of tax
loss, even though that tax loss was the object of the conspiracy.  Not liking
that result because the indicated Guidelines range understated the gravity
of the defendant’s conduct, the prosecutors asked the court to impose a
section 3553(a)/Booker upward variance.  The sentencing court also did
not like the result and did not interpret the term “tax loss” so narrowly as
to preclude its application simply because the count of conviction was con-
spiracy rather than a substantive tax crime.  The tax loss within the scope
of the conspiracy was $400 million, thus making the BOL substantial,
under the tax tables in sections 2T1.1 and 2T1.4, with a resulting Guide-
lines range (after all adjustments) of 210–260 months.  The sentencing
court then made a 93% Booker downward variance to fifteen months,
under section 3553(a), saying that the court would have imposed the same
sentence had there been no “tax loss.”  The Second Circuit held that the
sentencing court had properly included the tax loss in the Guidelines cal-
culations, but that the sentencing court’s statement that the same sen-
tence would have applied without a tax loss made any error “harmless.”114
So, is this “benefit” of the conspiracy plea available or not?  I do not
know.  It does not sound right, which, of course, is what grabbed the sen-
tencing judge’s attention (and, I think, the appeals judges’ attention).  On
the other hand, I do not think the prosecutors would have stipulated to it
or the probation office would have agreed if there were not a strong basis
for it.115  Defendants attempting to exploit this opportunity must also be
prepared for a similar response from the prosecutors (grudging accept-
ance with a request for upward variance) and from sentencing courts (a
stiffer sentence based on interpretation or Booker variance).116
113. Id. at 94 (emphasis added) (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MAN-
UAL § 2T1.1(c)(1) (2013)).
114. Id. at 92–94.
115. I throw out one consideration for those wanting to exploit the opportu-
nity.  It seems to me that the argument is better if the count of conviction is solely
for the Klein defraud conspiracy and is not for the offense conspiracy.
116. This feature of the Coplan case is not discussed in the CTM.
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C. FBAR Violations
Report of Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts (FBAR) criminal and
civil tax initiatives have been a major component of tax enforcement re-
cently.  United States persons with a financial interest or signatory author-
ity over foreign accounts are required to file FBARs by June 30th of each
year.117  The FBAR form is just an information form.  Civil and criminal
penalties apply if the FBAR is not filed or if an erroneous FBAR is filed.118
Taxpayers often fail to file FBARs in order to conceal tax evasion through
not reporting the income from the accounts on their income tax re-
turns.119  When FBAR violations relate only to tax crimes, the courts deter-
mine the Guidelines BOL under the tax crimes provisions in section 2T1,
which is driven by the tax loss.  This requires some explanation.
The starting point in the Guidelines for monetary report violations,
including FBARs, is chapter 2, part S.  The starting point for tax violations
is chapter 2, part T.  You will recall that the methodology in chapter 2 of
the Guidelines is to determine a BOL with certain adjustments before
moving on to the other adjustments in chapters 3 and 4.
The chapter 2, part S calculations, specifically Guidelines section
2S1.3, are at first glance very ugly.  The chapter 2 offense level is calcu-
lated as a monetary crime (theft) keyed to the amount that is not reported
on the FBAR.  The chapter 2, part T calculations, by contrast, key the
chapter 2 offense level to the amount of tax evaded.  The result is that the
offense level under part S can move up far quicker than the offense level
under part T.  I will not get into the details of how that works, but I do
provide a summary guide with precautions in the footnote.120
117. See 31 U.S.C. § 5314 (2012); 31 C.F.R. § 103.24 (2013).
118. See 31 U.S.C. § 5322(a) (addressing criminal penalties); id.
§ 5321(a)(5)(B)(i) (addressing civil penalties).  One counterintuitive result for a
false FBAR is the possibility, suggested by an IRS counsel in a panel discussion, that
the relevant Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) criminal statutes perhaps do not really cover a
false FBAR, so that, at least in his experience, the principal and perhaps only
charge would be a false statement charge under 18 U.S.C. § 1001.  This merely
illustrates the truism that there are overlapping criminal charges that the Govern-
ment can pursue, so that avoiding one only to draw another may be a pyrrhic
victory.
119. The Code requires taxation of all income from whatever source derived.
26 U.S.C. § 61(a) (2012).  There is no exclusion for income sourced outside the
United States. See id.
120. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2S1.3 (2013); id. ch. 2, pt. T.
The FBAR violations are sentenced under chapter 2, part S.  Section 2S1.3, which
normally keys the offense level to the theft table in section 2B1.1, provides certain
adjustments in section 2S1.3(b). See id. § 2S1.3(b).  The first two of those adjust-
ments relating to illegal activity increase the offense level determined under the
theft table, but the third, which applies if the first two do not, decreases the offense
level to six. See id.  The cross-reference in section 2S1.3(c) says the offense level for
tax crimes is determined under chapter 2, part T if higher than the section 2S1.3
offense level. Id. § 2S1.3(c).  In monetary offenses keyed to the gross value, rather
than taxes resulting from the gross value, the part T tax offense level will usually
not be higher than the part S offense level unless the part S offense is reduced to
33
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D. Tax Loss in the Section 3553(a)/Booker Phase of Sentencing
We observed an instance of where the sentencing court’s dissatisfac-
tion with the tax loss calculations was fixed by application of a section
3553(a)/Booker variance.  In that case, the Guidelines calculation was too
low because of an underinclusive interpretation of the definition of tax
six.  So, the “holy grail” is to make sure that the part S offense level is reduced to
six.  Otherwise, the part S offense level will usually greatly exceed the part T of-
fense level, and the part S offense level will apply.  To repeat, you get to offense
level six only if the first two adjustments in section 2S1.3(b) and certain other
conditions do not apply.
For those wanting to follow through on that (particularly important if the
defendant is charged or agrees to plea to an FBAR violation), you will have to
parse the first two exceptions in section 2S1.3(b). See id. § 2S1.3(b).  They are not
models of clarity, and I am not aware of any authoritative interpretations of those
first two exceptions.  You will have to research and reach your own conclusions,
but, as noted, you do not want either of those exceptions to apply, because the
resulting part S offense level will be higher than the part T offense level, which
requires that the part S offense level apply.  I would offer more of a discussion of
those two exceptions, except that certain anecdotal evidence from the recent plea
agreements to FBAR violations in tax crime settings suggests that all of the par-
ties—the defendants, the prosecutors, the probation office, and the courts—seem
to assume that the base offense level is under part T rather than part S, which
necessarily means that they believe the first two section 2S1.3(b) exceptions do not
apply, and thus, the third exception applies and drops the part S minimum offense
level to six.  Having said that, I should also note that one experienced litigator
commented—during the meeting of the Civil and Criminal Penalties Section at
the 2011 ABA Tax Section Meeting—that the USAO for the Southern District of
New York interpreted FBAR violations in a tax setting to invoke one of the two
adjustments in section 2S1.3(b), thus precluding application of the Tax Guidelines
under section 2T1.
I think the concern related to section 2S1.3(b)(2)(B) is that it applies and
increases the BOL by two levels if the defendant “committed the offense [the
FBAR] as part of a pattern of unlawful activity involving more than $100,000 in a
12-month period . . . .” Id. § 2S1.3(b)(2).  In a legal source and use of proceeds
case, the question would be whether this could apply if more than $100,000 is
involved in each year and there is a failure to file the FBAR for several years, mak-
ing it a pattern of “illegal” activity.
Therefore, anyone representing a person charged with an FBAR violation
must reach his or her own level of comfort on this issue.  I do not think it is self-
evident from the actual words used.  I do think, however, that the sense of the
exceptions is that they should not apply in a legal source and use income tax case.
Note that a similar issue of interpretation of this language is presented in 31 U.S.C.
§ 5322(b) that, on parallel language, doubles up the criminal penalties for FBAR
and other BSA violations. See 31 U.S.C. § 5322(b).  I reached a similar conclusion
in discussing that statute not because the text compels it, but because the anecdo-
tal evidence indicates that the language is interpreted not to apply to legal source
income tax violations.  I should finally caution that this anecdotal evidence may
even be a form of dicta, because in these anecdotal plea settings it was clear that
the actual Booker sentence would never get above the base level provided in section
5322(b) and would not be as prescribed in Guidelines section 2S1.3 by reference
to the theft table. See id.; see also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2S1.3
(2013).  Caution is in order. See Jack Townsend, Sentencing Simon (Preliminary and
Final), FED. TAX CRIMES BLOG (Mar. 18, 2011, 3:07 PM), http://federaltaxcrimes.
blogspot.com/2011/03/preliminary-sentencing-findings-in.html (providing exam-
ple of calculation under Guidelines section 2S1.3).
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loss.  Let’s look at a recent case where the defendant urged that the Guide-
lines tax loss calculation stipulated in the plea agreement was too high,
and, if the defendant could not fix the problem in the Guidelines calcula-
tion itself, he should have been allowed to fix it via section 3553(a)/Booker
discretion.
In that case,121 the defendant pled to five counts of tax evasion.122
Based on a stipulated loss of $2.4 million, the indicated Guidelines range
was thirty-three to forty-one months.  Exercising its variance authority
under section 3553(a), the sentencing court sentenced the defendant to
thirty months, a three-month variance from the bottom end of the Guide-
lines range.123  At sentencing, the defendant attempted to revise the stipu-
lated $2.4 million tax loss down to $40,000, obviously a substantial
reduction.  Apparently concerned about the veracity of the $40,000 tax
loss claim, the sentencing court refused to change the tax loss for sentenc-
ing or to relieve him from the plea agreement.  The defendant had waived
his right to object and, the sentencing court reasoned, a deal is a deal.
The defendant argued that, notwithstanding the sentencing court’s refusal
to relieve him of the $2.4 million stipulation for purposes of the Guide-
lines calculations, the court could and should nevertheless consider the
$40,000 tax loss for purposes of calibrating a just sentence under the man-
date of section 3553.  The court of appeals held that the stipulation by its
terms was binding “for sentencing” and not just for the Guidelines range
calculations.124  That stipulation, of course, is not binding on the sentenc-
ing court, but even where the sentencing court could reject the stipula-
tion, there is no requirement that the sentencing court reject the
stipulation.  And, of course, the sentencing court’s skepticism about the
validity of the claimed $40,000 tax loss was a factor.125
Basically, I surmise, the defendant just did not convince the court that
the quality of his evidence or proffer raised a real legitimate claim that the
tax was $40,000 rather than $2.4 million (or some material number less
than $2.4 million).  If the defendant had done so, I suspect that the prose-
cutors or the sentencing court would have found some way to give the
defendant all or most of the credit for the reduction, notwithstanding the
stipulation in the plea agreement.
121. United States v. Yooho Weon, 722 F.3d 583 (4th Cir. 2013).
122. Id. at 585.  It is not clear why the Government insisted on a plea to five
counts, because the Guidelines range considering relevant conduct or, it seems to
me, any reasonably expected variance, would all fit within the incarceration per-
mitted by a single count of tax evasion (sixty months).  Often more counts are
required in order to get the number of maximum months via stacking indicated by
the pattern of conduct, but that seems not to have been the case in Yooho Weon. See
id.
123. Id. at 587.
124. Id. at 589.
125. See id. at 587.
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III. RESTITUTION
A. General
Statutory restitution (as opposed to contractual restitution) is permit-
ted only for the count(s) of conviction and thus, unlike tax loss, does not
include relevant conduct.126  However, if the count of conviction is
broadly worded to cover a scheme, conspiracy, or pattern of criminal activ-
ity, the scope of restitution can include reasonably foreseeable tax loss at-
tributable to that activity, even if not separately charged or convicted.127
B. Restitution in Tax Cases
Tax crimes under title 26 are not included among the offenses for
which restitution is authorized in the statutes.  Statutory restitution is thus
not allowed for a pure tax offense of conviction.128  Of course, if the
count(s) of conviction include(s) a conspiracy (either an offense conspir-
acy or a Klein defraud conspiracy), or some other title 18 offense, statutory
restitution is permitted.129  Finally, given the charging choices the prose-
cutors have and the incentives for a defendant to plead with a require-
ment of contractual restitution, the DOJ Criminal Tax Manual (CTM)
notes that “in virtually every criminal tax case in which it is appropriate,
there is a way to obtain restitution.”130
126. DOJ CTM, supra note 9, § 44.03[2][a].
127. See 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)(2) (2012).  This provision can apply even to ac-
quitted conduct within the scope of the broader convicted conduct. See DOJ CTM,
supra note 9, § 44.03[2][b] (citing United States v. Foley, 508 F.3d 627, 635–36
(11th Cir. 2007)) (observing that restitution amount properly included acquitted
conduct and district court could award restitution to any victim of scheme fur-
thered by defendant’s mail fraud offense); see also United States v. Brock-Davis, 504
F.3d 991, 998–99 (9th Cir. 2007) (noting that restitution may be ordered for losses
to persons harmed in course of defendant’s scheme even beyond counts of
conviction).
128. See United States v. Minneman, 143 F.3d 274, 284 (7th Cir. 1998) (citing
United States v. Gottesman, 122 F.3d 150, 151 (2d Cir. 1997)); see also United
States v. Stout, 32 F.3d 901, 905 (5th Cir. 1994).
129. See 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)(1)(A); DOJ CTM, supra note 9, § 44.02[1]–[2].
For a case discussing restitution when title 18 hooks into what is really a tax of-
fense, see Minneman, 143 F.3d at 284 (citing United States v. Helmsley, 941 F.2d
71, 101 (2d Cir. 1991)).  For this reason, the Government will charge some tax
offenses under title 18 rather than title 26. See DOJ CTM, supra note 9, § 22.02[1]
(noting that false refund claim cases can be prosecuted as tax crimes under title
26, for example, under section 7206(1)–(2), but are charged under title 18 “be-
cause restitution for Title 18 offenses is more readily available than for Title 26
offenses”).
130. DOJ CTM, supra note 9, § 44.01.  The DOJ CTM also provides the follow-
ing statement in a footnote, expanding on the statement in the text above: “Of
course, there are exceptions.  There are a number of factors the district court will
have to consider in determining whether to impose discretionary restitution.  An
important factor is the defendant’s ability to pay.” Id. § 44.01 n.2 (citing 26 U.S.C.
§ 3663(a)(1)(B)(i)(II)).
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The amount for restitution is not the same as for the tax loss, even for
the count(s) of conviction.  The CTM explains:
The calculation of the amount of loss for purposes of restitution
when the IRS is the victim may be closely related to the calcula-
tion of the tax loss used to determine a defendant’s base offense
level.  But tax loss under the Sentencing Guidelines is usually the
intended loss, while the amount of restitution is always limited to
an actual loss.  Thus, tax loss may be greater than the amount of
restitution.  Generally, however, the district court may rely upon
the same “quantity and quality of evidence” to determine the
amount of loss in both contexts.131
Restitution, being the actual loss, thus would not be subject to the denial
of the benefit of unrelated, unclaimed deductions now required for tax
loss calculations.  Furthermore, the defendant often will have paid some of
the tax loss prior to sentencing.  Hence, the restitution amount will often
be less than the tax loss amount.
One incentive for the defendant to agree to restitution beyond the
count(s) of conviction is that it permits the defendant to argue that the
defendant has made what some practitioners call “extraordinary restitu-
tion,” which I am led to believe simply describes restitution beyond that
which a court could impose without the taxpayer’s contractual agreement
or voluntary payment.  The statutes and Guidelines do not address that
concept, but, based on anecdotal hearsay evidence, some practitioners be-
lieve that it plays well with some sentencing judges.
That statutory restitution is not required for title 26 tax crimes is not
an anomaly.  In tax cases, of course, the victim is the United States, and
the harm is the tax not paid.  The United States has “elaborate proce-
dures” for determining and collecting tax independent of the criminal
system.132  As noted below, this system will be engaged after the criminal
case is concluded, at least when the taxpayer is the criminal defendant.
The IRS will conduct such further investigation as necessary to determine
the correct civil tax liability and then send a notice of deficiency for the
taxes due.  As also noted, the amount the taxpayer may owe for civil tax
purposes may be larger—sometimes much larger—than the tax evaded
number used in the prosecution or in sentencing.133  Accordingly, restitu-
131. Id. § 44.03[5].  The Seventh Circuit has recently cautioned:
District courts can get into trouble if they rely unquestioningly on these
figures [the equation of tax loss and restitution], however, because the
loss amount for sentencing considers not just the conduct underlying the
conviction but “relevant conduct” accompanying it.  Calculations for res-
titution are not so permissive.  They are rigidly compartmentalized to the
actual losses resulting from the conduct of the convicted offenses.
United States v. Berkowitz, 732 F.3d 850, 853 n.3 (7th Cir. 2013) (citation
omitted).
132. See Minneman, 143 F.3d at 285–86.
133. See DOJ CTM, supra note 9, § 44.06.  The CTM provides:
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tion is not available in tax cases, except where the defendant consents to it
in the plea agreement or the sentencing judge orders it as a condition of
some benefit that the defendant is not otherwise entitled to.134
For the taxpayer defendant, an obligation of restitution for the tax
evaded is, of course, redundant with the underlying obligation (at least
the portion of the tax obligation—underpayment or “deficiency” in tax
speak—attributable to fraud).135  As noted, the IRS has elaborate mecha-
nisms to determine and assess the amount of the tax and to collect the
amount so assessed.  So, the imperative to order restitution in the criminal
phase, even if there is a required title 18 offense, is not so great.  As to
taxpayers who are defendants ordered to pay restitution, therefore, there
is some redundancy, although there are some differences discussed later
in this section.
But, enablers—persons other than the taxpayer whose taxes are in-
volved—may be convicted of tax crimes, including tax evasion.  Particu-
larly where the Government is for some reason unable to collect from the
taxpayers, the Government may seek an order of restitution from con-
victed enablers who are often convicted for a title 18 crime, such as the
Klein conspiracy.136  If the Government does seek restitution, it will have
Prosecutors should remember that, as discussed in Section 44.03 above,
restitution in criminal tax cases is limited only to losses caused by the
criminal conduct of the defendant and generally does not include penal-
ties or amounts of tax related to purely civil items.  Therefore, in all crim-
inal tax cases in which a restitution order is contemplated, care should be
taken not to compromise the ability of the IRS to attempt to collect the
civil tax liability, interest, and penalties.
Id.
134. See Weinberger v. United States, 268 F.3d 346, 358 (6th Cir. 2001); see
also United States v. Anderson, 545 F.3d 1072, 1078–80 (D.C. Cir. 2008).  The
court in Anderson permitted plea agreement restitution in what was then the largest
tax crime conviction, even though (i) the plea agreement cited the wrong title 18
section, a phenomenon the Government urged and the court held was a scriv-
ener’s error that did not vitiate the parties’ meeting of the minds to agree to resti-
tution; and (ii) the plea agreement did not state an amount for restitution. See
Anderson, 545 F.3d at 1078–80.  In United States v. Hammon, the court found that the
plea agreement contract restitution provision did not state that the restitution
amount was the proper tax liability and that it at most was ambiguous. See United
States v. Hammon, 277 F. App’x. 560, 565 (6th Cir. 2008).  Hence, the defendant
was permitted to contest the amount in the subsequent civil tax proceeding. See id.
135. For this reason, the restitution amounts are assessed and payments on
restitution for tax liabilities are credited to the corresponding tax liability. See Res-
titution Payable to the IRS, IRM 5.1.5.24.1(3), (5) (Aug. 3, 2009); see also I.R.S. Small
Bus. & Self-Emp’d Div. Mem. SBSE-05-0713-0044 (July 10, 2013), available at http:/
/www.irs.gov/pub/foia/ig/spder/SBSE-05-0713-0044.pdf.  See below for prompt
assessment procedures applicable to tax restitution.
136. See 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2012); United States v. Klein, 247 F.2d 908 (2d Cir.
1957).  There might be an issue if the enabler is only convicted of the crime of tax
evasion, a title 26 crime, via 18 U.S.C. § 2 (aiding and abetting and causing liabil-
ity). See 18 U.S.C. § 2.  This title 18 provision adopts the construct of making the
actor a principal in the crime aided, abetted, or caused.  The crime that they are
thus made principals of is tax evasion, a title 26 crime, for which restitution is not
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to prove the amount of the restitution or get the defendant to agree.  In
the sentencing phase where this is relevant, the Government’s standard of
proof is only a preponderance of the evidence, not beyond a reasonable
doubt as required for conviction of the substantive criminal charges.
Although the statute does not permit restitution for title 26 crimes of
conviction, the court may provide restitution for such crimes of conviction
in the following instances.  First, 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)(3) permits a court to
order restitution if the parties agree to it.137  The plea agreement is a con-
tract.  It may be enforced as a contract, and the sentencing court may in-
clude the agreements reached in the sentencing terms.  Thus, if the
parties in the plea agreement provide for restitution, the court may im-
pose that term.138
Second, the court may impose restitution as a condition of some ben-
efit that it is giving the defendant, such as probation or supervised re-
lease.139  If the defendant wants the benefit, the defendant has to accept
the restitution cost of the benefit.140  Where the court orders restitution
on this basis, like other statutory restitution, it is limited to the tax evaded
for the count(s) of conviction.141
Moreover, the district court can achieve most of the same effect as
restitution by ordering, as a condition of supervised release or pursuant to
the plea agreement, that the defendant file correct delinquent or
amended past year tax returns and pay any resulting unpaid tax.142  The
allowed by the statutes. See id.; see also John A. Townsend, Theories of Criminal Liabil-
ity for Tax Evasion (Working Paper, 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=
2060496 (discussing constructs of 18 U.S.C. § 2).  Hence, I question whether the
statutory restitution provision would apply in such a case.
137. 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)(3); see also DOJ CTM, supra note 9, § 44.03[8].
138. See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 406 F.3d 323, 330 (5th Cir. 2005).
139. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3563(b)(1), 3583(d); DOJ CTM, supra note 9,
§ 44.01[3]; see also United States v. Batson, 608 F.3d 630, 634 (9th Cir. 2010) (“The
district court is therefore authorized by § 3563(b)(2) to order restitution as a con-
dition of probation to the victim of any criminal offense, including those in Title
26, for which probation is properly imposed.”); United States v. Nolen, 523 F.3d
331, 332 (5th Cir. 2008) (ordering restitution as condition of granting supervised
release); United States v. Dahlstrom, 180 F.3d 677, 686 (5th Cir. 1999); cf. Miller,
406 F.3d at 330 (declining to reach issue of whether, absent defendant’s consent to
restitution, sentencing court could order restitution).
140. However, in Miller, the defendant argued, in effect, that he could bifur-
cate the restitution from the supervised release and, because he did not agree to
restitution in the plea agreement, restitution could not be imposed. Miller, 406
F.3d at 328–29.  The court rejected that idea.  The court side-stepped the technical
point Miller raised by finding that his plea agreement did authorize the restitution
imposed. Id. at 329–30.  Restitution as a condition of supervised release may in-
clude years other than the year(s) of the count(s) of conviction. See United States
v. Johnson, No. 10-30911, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 22346, at *6–7 (5th Cir. Nov. 4,
2011) (discussing this aspect of Miller).
141. See Nolen, 523 F.3d at 332.
142. See United States v. Thomas, 635 F.3d 13, 21–22 (1st Cir. 2011) (citing
United States v. Miller, 557 F.3d 919, 921–22 (8th Cir. 2009)).  In Thomas, the First
Circuit held that (i) a district court can impose these obligations as a condition of
39
Townsend: Tax Evaded in the Federal Tax Crimes Sentencing Process and Beyon
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2014
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLR\59-3\VLR306.txt unknown Seq: 40 14-AUG-14 15:02
638 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59: p. 599
effect of such a generic order may sweep beyond the years for the count(s)
of conviction.  Such an order also requires the defendant to satisfy a tax
obligation the defendant already has.  And, since the obligation exists in-
dependent of restitution, the Government can rely upon collection tools
for that obligation, which, as noted above, are more extensive than restitu-
tion collection tools.143  Practically, an order to comply with past tax obli-
gations achieves most of the effects of an order of restitution.144
DOJ Tax has a policy that prosecutors “must consider” including a
restitution requirement in the plea agreement for a criminal tax case.145
Further, restitution is the rule, rather than the exception, and it is availa-
ble by plea agreement in virtually every criminal tax case.146  This means
that restitution will be included, barring some compelling reason not to.
Furthermore, the plea agreement restitution amount will (i) include not
only the amount for the agreed count(s) of conviction, but also relevant
conduct for the dismissed counts and non-charged years, and (ii) will
avoid language committing the IRS to that amount as the ultimate civil tax
liability (there may be noncriminal adjustments that support a higher ulti-
mate tax liability).147
supervised release, and (ii) “[t]he district court was not ordering Thomas to com-
pensate the government for a loss suffered as a result of his criminal actions,
though this is a salutary side-effect of its order.” Id. at 21; see also United States v.
Perry, 714 F.3d 570, 577 n.5 (8th Cir. 2013) (“Another way to impose essentially
the same special condition is to require that the defendant while on supervised
release comply with the tax laws and cooperate with the IRS by filing tax returns
and paying amounts due. . . .  [T]his type of condition is not an order of restitu-
tion . . . .”); United States v. Shaw, 446 F. App’x 357, 359 (2d Cir. 2011) (citing
United States v. Gottesman, 122 F.3d 150 (2d Cir. 1997)) (distinguishing Gottes-
man, where court’s order was generic to pay past due taxes as agreed in future
between defendant and IRS).
143. I note below in the text that Congress has provided for the IRS to be able
to assess promptly and collect the amount in tax restitution orders in some cases.
The IRS cannot assess immediately if the obligation is a general order to comply
with past tax filing and payment obligations, and the IRS will then have to go
through the Code procedures predicate to assessment—issuing a notice of defi-
ciency permitting the taxpayer to litigate in the Tax Court prior to assessment.
144. See Thomas, 635 F.3d at 21 (“The district court was not ordering Thomas
to compensate the government for a loss suffered as a result of his criminal ac-
tions, though this is a salutary side-effect of its order.”).
145. See DOJ CTM, supra note 9, § 44.01.  The Attorney General’s Guidelines
state that “[i]n all plea discussions, prosecutors must consider ‘requesting that the
defendant provide full restitution to all victims of all charges contained in the
indictment or information, without regard to the counts to which the defendant
actually plead[s].’” Id. (citing USAM, supra note 9, §§ 9-27.230, 9-27.420, 9-
27.430); see also USAM, supra note 9, § 6-4.370; IRS/DOJ MEMO RE STANDARD LAN-
GUAGE, supra note 44.
146. See DOJ CTM, supra note 9, § 44.01.
147. See id. § 5.01[7].  The criminal tax process is not suited to determine the
actual civil tax liability.  From the investigation through sentencing, the process is
focused on the criminal tax numbers (usually the same as the tax loss for sentenc-
ing).  There may be any number of difficult and uncertain civil tax adjustments
that do not get resolved any time during the sentencing process and are better
resolved later through the civil adjustment processes allowed by the IRS.  Having
40
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Restitution of the tax liability may include both the principal and the
statutory interest.148  This is not true of the tax loss for sentencing except
in evasion of payment cases.149  Some courts have used fines as a substitute
for restitution in tax cases.  In a recent section 7202 case involving unpaid
taxes withheld from employees, the tax loss substantially exceeded the in-
dicated fine range under the Sentencing Guidelines.  The sentencing
court noted that it could not order restitution but, at the Government’s
request, could impose a fine outside the Guidelines range based upon sec-
tion 3571’s grant of authority to impose an “alternate fine based upon
gain” to the defendant.150  I suggest, however, that use of the fine in this
way is only appropriate in cases where the IRS does not have the ability to
assess the tax in issue against the defendant, otherwise, there will be
double collection of the tax—once as a tax151 and once as a fine that
would not otherwise have been imposed.
IV. TAX LIABILITY AFTER SENTENCING
A. Restitution (Enforcement, Assessment, and Payment)
1. Restitution Generally
Restitution is a lien enforceable like other liens, including tax liens,
but does not have the special Code enforcement measures that tax liens
said that, in a panel discussion in which I participated, an IRS attorney with crimi-
nal enforcement responsibilities said that, in his geographical areas of responsibil-
ity, the IRS would often agree contemporaneously with sentencing to close out the
civil tax liability through a closing agreement, Form 906.  That document is not
filed with the court, but will close out the civil tax liability.
148. See 26 U.S.C. § 6601 (2012).  Interest accrues on a tax liability as a matter
of law. See id.  The interest represents a loss to the Government and thus may be
included in restitution. See United States v. Perry, 714 F.3d 570, 577 (8th Cir.
2013) (citing “United States v. Ellefsen, 655 F.3d 769, 782 (8th Cir. 2011) (af-
firming a restitution award to IRS that included interest); [United States v. Has-
sebrock, 663 F.3d 906, 926 (7th Cir. 2011)] (same); United States v. Qurashi, 634
F.3d 699, 703–04 (2d Cir. 2011)”).
149. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2.T1.1 cmt. n.1 (2013).  Nor-
mally, where a defendant pleads to evasion of assessment, the court would not
permit including interest and penalties in calculating the tax loss. See id.  However,
where the defendant committed acts of evasion of payment, the tax loss can in-
clude interest on that relevant conduct tax loss. See Thomas, 635 F.3d at 17–18.
150. United States v. Ellis, 548 F.3d 539, 546 (7th Cir. 2008).  Note that for
this type of tax liability, the IRS certainly could have assessed the tax against the
defendant under section 6672, so it had the usual tax tools to collect the tax from
the defendant. See 26 U.S.C. § 6672.  It is unclear from the cryptic Ellis decision
why the Government felt that using the power to depart from the Guidelines fine
was appropriate in that particular case. See Ellis, 548 F.3d at 546.  The reason this is
important is that unexplained use of the fine power would seem to be contrary to
the intent of Congress not to require restitution in tax cases.
151. Or, in the case posited, as a trust fund recovery penalty under section
6672. See Ellis, 548 F.3d at 539; see also 26 U.S.C. § 6672.
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have.152  Restitution (whether for taxes or otherwise) may be enforced
under the Federal Debt Collection Procedures Act (FDCPA).153  The Gov-
ernment’s ability to enforce restitution under the FDCPA is made subject
to the Consumer Credit Protection Act (CCPA),154 but if the restitution is
for taxes, the garnishment restrictions of the CCPA are not applicable.155
Restitution also may be enforced by administrative offset under the Trea-
sury Offset Program, whereby the Treasury can offset nontax debts—for
this purpose, restitution itself is nontax even though it relates to the tax
liability—against other amounts due to the defendant from the Govern-
ment (including refunds).156
Finally, restitution obligations are not subject to discharge in bank-
ruptcy, and the automatic stay provisions of bankruptcy do not preclude
enforcement of restitution, including proceeding against the debtor’s
property and any property nominally held by the bankruptcy estate and
revocation of probation for violation of the restitution order.157
2. Tax Restitution
Historically, after sentencing, the IRS would pursue the normal tax
assessment and collection measures for tax restitution (plus any additional
civil tax liability not included in restitution).  Practitioners are quite famil-
iar with those measures, so I will just summarize them here.  Since the
taxes usually will not have been assessed, the IRS must first assess the tax.
At a minimum, assessment will require an open statute of limitations,
152. See 18 U.S.C. § 3664(m)(1)(A) (2012); id. § 3613.  As to restitution, see
particularly section 3613(c) and (f). See id. § 3613(c) (“[A]n order of restitu-
tion . . . is a lien in favor of the United States on all property and rights to property
of the person fined as if the liability of the person fined were a liability for a tax
assessed under the Internal Revenue Code of 1986.”); id. § 3613(f) (“[A]ll provi-
sions of this section are available to the United States for the enforcement of an
order of restitution.”); see also United States v. DeCay, 620 F.3d 534, 541 (5th Cir.
2010).
153. 28 U.S.C. § 3205 (2012); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3664(m)(1)(A); United
States v. Clayton, 613 F.3d 592, 596 (5th Cir. 2010) (“The United States is author-
ized to enforce any restitution order imposed as part of a criminal sentence by
using its powers under the FDCPA.”); United States v. Phillips, 303 F.3d 548,
550–51 (5th Cir. 2002) (explaining FDCPA in detail).
154. 15 U.S.C. § 1673 (2012).
155. Clayton, 613 F.3d at 596.
156. See I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. PMTA 2011-034 (Apr. 26, 2010), available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/lanoa/pmta_2011-34.pdf.
157. See United States v. Robinson, 494 B.R. 715, 718–19 (W.D. Tenn. 2013).
Section 3613(a) provides that “[n]otwithstanding any other Federal law . . . a judg-
ment imposing [restitution] may be enforced against all property or rights to prop-
erty of the person [ordered to pay restitution] . . . .”  18 U.S.C. § 3613(a).  In a
well-reasoned opinion, Robinson held that this language trumps the automatic stay
both as to the debtor and to the nominal transfer of the debtor’s property to the
bankruptcy estate. See Robinson, 494 B.R. at 718–19; see also United States v. Co-
lasuonno, 697 F.3d 164, 174 (2d Cir. 2012) (holding that probation revocation
proceedings for failure to pay restitution imposed as condition of probation are
not subject to bankruptcy automatic stay).
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which will usually exist if the defendant has been criminally prosecuted.158
And, the IRS must do all predicate acts for assessment, which, most impor-
tantly, include issuing a notice of deficiency for income and estate and gift
taxes.159  This procedure will permit a taxpayer to delay assessment by fil-
ing a Tax Court proceeding.
In 2010, Congress enacted provisions to make the amount ordered
for restitution of tax immediately assessable and collectible without the
usual predicate notice of deficiency.160  The IRS is required to assess the
restitution amount once the criminal judgment becomes final.161  A no-
tice of deficiency is not required as a predicate to assessment of the restitu-
tion amount.162  The defendant/taxpayer may not thereafter contest
civilly the tax restitution amount so assessed.163  Although it is clear that
the provision applies to tax restitution ordered for a count of conviction
under title 26 of the Internal Revenue Code, it is perhaps not clear that
158. See 26 U.S.C. § 6501(c)(1) (2012).
159. See id. § 6213(a).  I am not sure whether this statute applies as to restitu-
tion for taxes for which the defendant is not liable as the taxpayer.  For example,
assume that the defendant is convicted under section 7202 for failure of the em-
ployer for whom he or she worked to withhold and pay over taxes on employees.
The defendant may be ultimately liable under section 6672 for the trust fund re-
covery penalty, but the underlying tax liability is the employer’s tax liability and
not the defendant’s.  The trust fund taxes can be awarded as restitution (either
statutory if the offense of conviction included a title 18 offense or contractual if
the defendant pled guilty), but the tax is still not the defendant’s tax and that
restitution amount cannot be assessed against the defendant.  All that means as a
practical matter is that the considerable tax collection measures offered by the
Code are not available; the less considerable (but still considerable) general resti-
tution enforcement provisions will be available. See id.
160. See Firearms Excise Tax Improvement Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-237,
§ 3(a), 124 Stat. 2497, 2497–98 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 6201(a)(4)) (making Act
effective for restitution orders entered after August 16, 2010).
161. See 26 U.S.C. § 6201(a)(4)(A), (B).  However, apparently because the
statutory language in section 6501(c)(11), dealing with these tax restitution assess-
ments, is the same as the unlimited civil statute for fraud in section 6501(c)(1),
there is no statute of limitations on assessing restitution for tax. See I.R.S. Notice
ECC 201221014 (May 25, 2012), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-wd/
1221014.pdf.  This may not be important, given the authority to assess immedi-
ately, which the IRS will surely do in all but rare cases.
162. See 26 U.S.C. § 6213(b)(5).
163. See 26 U.S.C. § 6201(a)(4)(C).  This provision is a bit odd, since even the
IRS recently stated that, “[c]riminal restitution and civil tax liability are separate
and distinct.  The assessment of restitution under section 6201(a)(4) is not itself a
determination of the actual civil tax liability for the tax period for which restitution
was ordered, and is assessed only ‘as if such amount were such tax.’”  I.R.S. Small
Bus. & Self-Emp’d Div. Mem. SBSE-05-0713-0044 (July 10, 2013), available at http:/
/www.irs.gov/pub/foia/ig/spder/SBSE-05-0713-0044.pdf.  Is it possible that resti-
tution for the tax can exceed the amount of the tax?  And, if so, is the defendant
prohibited from contesting the amount of the tax via IRS processes?  I have dis-
cussed various facets of this particular narrow issue on my Federal Tax Crimes Blog,
which can be accessed by either searching “restitution” or clicking the link named
“restitution.” See Jack Townsend, FED. TAX CRIMES BLOG, http://
federaltaxcrimes.blogspot.com.
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the provision applies to tax restitution for a count of conviction under title
18 or, for that matter, an FBAR count of conviction under title 31.164
If the IRS determines that the tax liability exceeds the amount or-
dered as restitution, the IRS must follow the required procedures (notice
of deficiency and subsequent assessment as allowed).165
Regardless of which procedure is used to make the tax assessment,
the IRS is authorized after assessment to use its powerful non-judicial col-
lection tools (lien and levy) to collect the assessed taxes.166  Amounts paid
as restitution for taxes are applied to the taxpayer’s tax liabilities for the
year(s) to which the restitution applies.167  Practitioners should note that
there is the possibility that restitution might actually exceed the tax liabil-
ity as finally determined for the year(s) involved.  That is particularly a
problem under the new procedure discussed above where the taxpayer is
not permitted to contest tax restitution assessed as a tax.168  This can re-
quire the taxpayer to pay more tax as restitution than is actually due.  The
only solution, apparently, is to request the sentencing court to modify the
order of restitution.169
164. See I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. CCA-111811-10 (Feb. 4, 2011), available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-wd/1105037.pdf.  This is an IRS email with an at-
tached outline for a presentation within the IRS.  This is not an official pronounce-
ment from the IRS and the author of the outline is not identified.  It is therefore
not clear that this is anything like an authoritative interpretation of the statute.
The outline states: “Our interpretation is that the assessed amount is limited to losses
attributable to Title 26 violations and does not include Title 18, tax-related charges.”
Id.  I have questioned this interpretation in my blog. See Jack Townsend, New Stat-
ute for Civil Effect of Restitution in Tax Cases, FED. TAX CRIMES BLOG (Feb. 11, 2011,
9:05 AM), http://federaltaxcrimes.blogspot.com/2011/02/new-statute-for-civil-ef-
fect-of.html.
165. Because the defendant is entitled to a notice of deficiency before assess-
ment, under 26 U.S.C. § 6213(a), and to pursue the prepayment remedy in the
Tax Court, that portion of the civil tax will be subject to the delays which are now
foreclosed for the tax restitution.
166. For additional nuances of the statute, see my Federal Tax Crimes Blog,
supra note 84.
167. See Morse v. Comm’r, 419 F.3d 829, 834 n.4 (8th Cir. 2005); United
States v. Helmsley, 941 F.2d 71, 102 (2d Cir. 1991) (“[W]e believe it is self-evident
that any amount paid as restitution for taxes owed must be deducted from any
judgment entered for unpaid taxes in . . . a civil proceeding.”); see also I.R.S. Chief
Couns. Mem. 200734020 (Aug. 24, 2007), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
wd/0734020.pdf.
168. See I.R.S. Notice CC-2013-012 (July 31, 2013).  I have discussed various
facets of this issue on my Federal Tax Crimes Blog. See Jack Townsend, Can Restitution
Be Reduced by Payments on the Tax Liability Subject to Restitution?, FED. TAX CRIMES
BLOG (Oct. 26, 2013, 3:43 PM), http://www.federaltaxcrimes.blogspot.com/2013/
10/can-restitution-be-reduced-by-payments.html (linking to earlier discussions).
169. One opportunity to contest the amount possibly exists where the IRS
claims tax liability in addition to the amount of the tax restitution, requiring issu-
ance of a notice of deficiency.  The defendant could petition the Tax Court and
argue that, not only is there no deficiency as alleged by the IRS, but that, by paying
the restitution amount previously assessed, the taxpayer has overpaid the tax.  The
Tax Court has jurisdiction to determine an overpayment. See 26 U.S.C.
§ 6512(b)(1) (2012).  Could the Tax Court determine the overpayment?  As a mat-
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Practitioners should be alert to creative payments of restitution.
There may not be many such opportunities, but consider the recent hold-
ings in two companion United States Tax Court cases.170  The facts were
that the taxpayers were officers and owners of a payroll service company
that withheld from employees’ salaries (including their own salaries as em-
ployees) but did not pay over the withheld trust fund taxes (or related
employer taxes) to the IRS.  The defendants alleged, apparently credibly,
to the Tax Court trial judge, that they did not know of the alleged failure
to pay over.  The defendants also failed to file their individual income tax
returns and were prosecuted as a result.171  For purposes of the criminal
case, the prosecutors and taxpayers agreed that the employer had with-
held about $510,000 in income tax from salaries and therefore that, in
computing the tax loss and restitution, the taxpayers were entitled to
credit for the withheld income tax.  As a result, for tax loss and restitution
purposes, they stipulated in the plea agreement, and the sentencing court
found, that the tax loss and restitution were only $60,000, representing the
net tax due in excess of the deemed “withheld” tax of $510,000.  Note that
in these calculations, the benefit to employees who fail to file is credit for
the withheld tax from the original due dates of the returns, thus saving
substantially on any civil penalties and interest that might otherwise apply.
But the net $60,000 unpaid on the original due dates of the returns was
still due and subject to penalties and interest if the action had stopped
there.  Orchestrated by their counsel, the taxpayers then belatedly paid
about $570,000—representing the aggregate of the withheld tax on their
salaries ($510,000) and the unpaid tax due ($60,000)—to the corporation
and had the corporation pay it to the IRS with a direction that it be ap-
plied to the taxpayers’ income tax liabilities as withholding.172
ter of jurisdiction?  As a matter of finality, using concepts of collateral estoppel?  As
a matter of statutory interpretation based upon the finality clearly intended by the
tax restitution assessment provision?  Then, would the IRS have to refund?
170. See Dixon v. Comm’r, 141 T.C. No. 3 (2013); Dixon v. Comm’r, 106
T.C.M. (CCH) 225 (2013).
171. See Dixon, 141 T.C. No. 3 at *1.  The taxpayers were not prosecuted for
the employer corporation’s failure to withhold.  As presented by the tax court
judges, they credibly testified that they did not know about the failure to withhold.
Apparently for that reason, the Government did not prosecute for that failure. See
id. at *3.  The amount of taxes that were not withheld (including those attributable
to all employees, including the taxpayers) was nearly $23 million. Id.  Later, while
the tax court case was pending, the taxpayers were operating another payroll ser-
vice company, which failed to pay over the withheld trust fund taxes.  The taxpay-
ers were prosecuted again, this time for tax evasion. Id. at *13.  In that proceeding,
according to the plea documents (not mentioned in the cases), the corporation’s
withheld, but not paid over trust fund taxes were included in relevant conduct. See
id.
172. It is not clear to me why the defendants paid the amount for which they
already had received credit against income tax for the amount contemporaneously
withheld.  They likely would have received credit in any subsequent civil proceed-
ing—as they actually did in this case.
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The taxpayers received credit as a payment on the original due dates
for the originally withheld portion ($510,000) and received credit for the
originally non-withheld portion of $60,000 but were only given that credit
from the date the corporation paid the amount.  Of course, the lion’s
share of the amount thus credited avoided penalties and interest at the
taxpayers’ level (which is the normal consequence of withholding), but
the other portion not actually withheld contemporaneously did not re-
ceive credit on the original due date of the taxpayers’ returns and thus was
subject to penalties and interest at the taxpayers’ level.173  This type of
restitution payment was creative, although not successful in part.
B. The Civil Tax Audit/Notice of Deficiency—The Civil Tax
Number/Deficiency
The IRS may also assert the unpaid civil tax liability by audit, which, as
noted above, will exceed the amount of the restitution ordered by the
court.  If the sentencing court does not include interest in restitution, the
assessment will include the interest.  Further, even if the sentencing court
does include interest in restitution, it will include further interest from the
date of the restitution order.  And, in all likelihood, penalties will be as-
sessed on at least the restitution amount and perhaps some of the other
portions of the tax ultimately assessed.  The normal tax collection mea-
sures will then be available to the IRS to collect any portion of the unpaid
assessments.
As noted above, the taxpayer is bound civilly by the amount of restitu-
tion determined in the criminal case.  But, as noted, the IRS can assert
more tax and penalties (with resulting interest) than were determined for
restitution.
An issue that may arise is whether either party may be bound by other
determinations made during the criminal process.  For example, in the
sentencing phase, the court is required to make determinations of the tax
loss.  Is that preclusive?  Of course, if the taxpayer has not paid any of the
tax loss, the tax loss and the restitution may be in the same amount.  But
what if the taxpayer has, prior to sentencing, fully paid the tax and even
173. It is unclear whether obtaining avoidance of penalties and interest at the
shareholder level was the goal of shuffling the monies through the corporation for
payment on withholding tax.  The taxpayers’ lawyer testified that the shuffling was
intended only to ensure that the corporation got the credit against the $23 million
trust fund tax that it owed.  The tax court trial judge questioned that because the
corporation would be entitled to that credit had the taxpayer paid the $60,000
taxes directly.  Rather, that judge seemed to imply that the shuffling through the
corporation was an attempt to wipe out the penalties and interest on the $60,000,
just as the penalties and interest had been wiped out on the original deemed with-
held amount of $510,000.  The taxpayers’ lawyer seemed to deny that, though.
One of the mysteries is the advantage to the taxpayers of even paying the $510,000
portion for which they were entitled to credit against their liabilities on the origi-
nal due date of the return.  The taxpayers’ attorney testified that they did it to
claim extraordinary restitution, which, although not a Sentencing Guidelines fac-
tor, could play well to a sentencing judge when sentencing the taxpayers.
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the penalties that might apply?  Can that taxpayer then assert that the IRS
is bound by the tax loss determination?  Can the IRS assert that the tax-
payer is bound by the tax loss determination?
The traditional way to approach potential binding effects of previ-
ously litigated issues in this context is via the doctrine of collateral estop-
pel.  In United States v. Montana,174 the Supreme Court summarized the
doctrine of collateral estoppel as follows: “[O]nce an issue is actually and
necessarily determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, that determi-
nation is conclusive in subsequent suits based on a different cause of ac-
tion involving a party to the prior litigation.”175  Courts have rejected
taxpayer attempts to collaterally estop the IRS in subsequent civil cases as
to the amount of the tax loss determined by the sentencing court.176  I
think that makes sense.  As noted above, the tax loss is not the same as the
tax the taxpayer may owe.  The tax loss is only the portion of the tax the
taxpayer owed that is attributable to fraud.  The taxpayer may owe more
tax that is not attributable to fraud.  The taxpayer should not get a benefit
from the criminal prosecution of paying less tax than the taxpayer owes.
And, of course, in collateral estoppel analysis, the amount of tax the tax-
payer owes was not litigated in the criminal proceeding.
Could the taxpayer make a more subtle argument that at least the tax
loss should be preclusive under collateral estoppel as to the amount attrib-
utable to fraud for purposes of determining the civil fraud penalty under
26 U.S.C. § 6663?  The issue—tax evaded and the portion of the tax attrib-
utable to fraud—is the same issue.  There are some subtle burden-shifting
nuances that, in my opinion, are just not of sufficient weight to forego
collateral estoppel on the issue of the portion of the tax attributable to
fraud.  While I hesitate to get too deeply into the burden of proof rules, I
will try to summarize them to introduce them to readers.
At sentencing, the court determines the amount of the tax loss—“the
total amount of loss that was the object of the offense.”177  That is basically
the same standard as the civil fraud standard in section 6663.178  At sen-
174. 440 U.S. 147 (1979).
175. Id. at 153.
176. See, e.g., Kosinski v. Comm’r, 541 F.3d 671, 679 (6th Cir. 2008) (rejecting
taxpayer’s claim that issue preclusion bound judge in civil proceeding to findings
from criminal sentencing proceeding); Maciel v. Comm’r, 489 F.3d 1013, 1025
(9th Cir. 2007) (holding issue preclusion presumptively inapplicable to sentencing
findings).
177. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2T1.1(c)(1) (2013).
178. See 26 U.S.C. § 6663 (2012).  The courts dealing with the civil fraud pen-
alty do not usually state the standard as the crisp elements in section 7201—affirm-
ative act, tax due and owing, and willfulness. See 26 U.S.C. § 7201; see also Cheek v.
United States, 498 U.S. 192, 196 (1991) (describing standard willfulness formula-
tion as “intentional violation of a known legal duty”).  Those courts do, however,
use words that, in my view, say the same thing.  For example, one court stated:
“Fraud is the intentional commission of an act or acts for the specific purpose of
evading tax believed to be due and owing.”  Eriksen v. Comm’r, 104 T.C.M. (CCH)
46 (2012).  Fraud requires that the taxpayer has “intended to evade taxes known to
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tencing, the court determines the tax loss based on a preponderance of
the evidence.  In the civil case, the court determines civil fraud under a
burden-shifting concept as follows: (i) the IRS must prove some portion of
the deficiency is due to civil fraud by clear and convincing evidence and
(ii) upon meeting that burden, the balance of the underpayment is
deemed to be subject to fraud, except to the extent that the taxpayer
shows otherwise.179  Now, the finding of tax loss at sentencing should not
be preclusive under collateral estoppel as to the first burden the IRS must
meet in the civil case, because the sentencing court determined tax loss by
a preponderance of the evidence.  In the civil case, the IRS should be
required to prove by clear and convincing evidence that some portion of
the tax deficiency is attributable to fraud.  But, once it has done so, we
focus on the burden-shifting in clause (ii).
The key difference is a theoretical one of who has the burden of per-
suasion as to the portion of the deficiency attributable to fraud.  In the
sentencing proceeding, the Government had the burden of persuasion to
show the tax evaded; in the civil proceeding, the taxpayer has the burden
of persuasion to show the part not attributable to fraud.  Both burdens are
based on a preponderance of the evidence—meaning that the allocation
of the burden only affects outcomes where the trier of fact is in equipoise.
According to astute observers of trial outcomes, it is not common that
triers are in equipoise.180  Hence, I would argue that the tax loss should be
preclusive as to the amount attributable to fraud for purposes of section
6663; the possibility that equipoise could affect the outcome is too incon-
sequential to justify re-litigating the issue.  In short, in the civil case, after
the IRS has established by clear and convincing evidence that some por-
tion of the deficiency is attributable to fraud, the portion that is then sub-
ject to the civil fraud penalty should be the amount of the sentencing tax
loss determined for that year.181  Readers should be wary, though, that I
cannot cite any authority for the reasoning and conclusion that I have just
expounded.
be due and owing by conduct intended to conceal, mislead, or otherwise prevent
the collection of taxes, and that there is an underpayment.”  Nelon v. Comm’r, 73
T.C.M. (CCH) 1843 (1997).
179. See 26 U.S.C. § 6663(b).
180. See Cigaran v. Heston, 159 F.3d 355, 357 (8th Cir. 1998) (“The shifting of
an evidentiary burden of preponderance is of practical consequence only in the
rare event of an evidentiary tie . . . .”); see also Blodgett v. Comm’r, 394 F.3d 1030,
1039 (8th Cir. 2004); Polack v. Comm’r, 366 F.3d 608, 613 (8th Cir. 2004) (citing
Cigaran, 159 F.3d at 357); Knudsen v. Comm’r, 131 T.C. 185, 188 (2008).
181. Some purists may argue that the dynamics of criminal trials may not re-
ally place a focus on determining the tax loss, and that it is potentially subject to
manipulation by the parties, if for no other reason than to reach a plea agreement.
But I would answer that the standard is the same in both situations, and the possi-
bility that the earlier proceeding may not have reached the right result is not a
reason to forego collateral estoppel in the second proceeding.
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Finally, a recent case has raised the prospect of another type of estop-
pel—judicial estoppel—that might apply to sentencing determinations.182
In that case, the taxpayer (in his role as defendant) and the prosecutors
stipulated in a plea agreement that “the total tax liability, including inter-
est and penalties, amounted to $448,776.13.”183  It is not clear what role
that stipulation played in the sentencing.  In any event, in the subsequent
refund suit, the court said that the taxpayer was judicially estopped from
claiming a lower amount.  The court reasoned that the taxpayer had
clearly stipulated as to the amount, but cited no authority that such stipu-
lations should be binding outside the proceeding at hand.  The court then
reasoned:
Moreover if Mirando was allowed to proceed in this action, he
would gain an unfair advantage.  By pleading guilty to tax evasion
and specifically agreeing to a total tax liability of $448,776.13,
Mirando avoided the possibility of a longer sentence and the
United States agreed not to prosecute Mirando’s ex-wife or two
children.  After obtaining this benefit from the United States,
Mirando cannot turn around and sue the United States for a
refund.
Plaintiff Mirando relies on United States v. Hammon for its position
that his refund claim is not barred by estoppel.  In Hammon, the
Sixth Circuit held that the defendant was not collaterally or judi-
cially estopped from denying the accuracy of the government’s
assessments despite pleading guilty to tax evasion and agreeing to
pay $2.39 million in restitution.  However, the present case can
be distinguished from Hammon.  In Hammon, the plea agreement
only stipulated that the defendant willfully attempted to evade
taxes assessed by the government in “the amount of approxi-
mately $2.39 million.”  Since the plea agreement was ambiguous
as to whether the defendant admitted that the $2.39 million as-
sessment was correct, the defendant was not estopped from chal-
lenging the accuracy of the tax assessment.  In contrast, Plaintiff
Mirando specifically agreed in his 2007 plea agreement that “be-
yond a reasonable doubt . . . [a]s of June 29, 2007, the total tax
liability, including interest and penalties, amounted to
$448,776.13.”  Consequently, Hammon is not controlling, and ju-
dicial estoppel prevents Mirando from bringing his refund
claim.184
I wonder whether the IRS would be bound by that stipulation.
182. See Mirando v. United States, No. 1:13-CV-00233, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
135659 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 8, 2013).
183. Id. at *2.
184. Id. at *8–9 (citations omitted); see also United States v. Hammon, 277 F.
App’x 560, 565 (6th Cir. 2008).
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V. CONCLUSION
As indicated, tax evaded—the part of unpaid civil liability the tax-
payer intended to evade—is at the heart of prosecution and sentencing in
federal tax cases.  Practitioners must know the nuances of the concept of
tax evaded as it plays out in the process.  By understanding the role of tax
evaded and working the numbers, practitioners can avoid pitfalls and
achieve benefits for clients.
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